Searching for a Solution: An Analysis of the Legislative Response to the Iraqi Antiquities Crisis of 2003 by Borke, Karin E.
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology 
& Intellectual Property Law 
Volume 13 
Issue 2 Fall 2003 Article 5 
Searching for a Solution: An Analysis of the Legislative Response 
to the Iraqi Antiquities Crisis of 2003 
Karin E. Borke 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip 
Recommended Citation 
Karin E. Borke, Searching for a Solution: An Analysis of the Legislative Response to the Iraqi Antiquities 
Crisis of 2003, 13 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 381 (2003) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol13/iss2/5 
This Legislative Updates is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized 
editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATIVE
RESPONSE TO THE IRAQI ANTIQUITIES
CRISIS OF 2003
INTRODUCTION
The fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in April 2003 marked the
end of an era of population oppression, a victory for the Coalition
Forces, and the beginning of Iraqi anarchy. Without the fear of
adverse consequences, Iraqis looted their own country. They
raided schools, government buildings, cultural institutions, and
thousands of archaeological sites, taking anything that could be of
value. The most publicized looting occurred at the National
Museum in Baghdad. The story of 170,000 antiquities being
stolen from the museum by "Ali Babas" as Coalition Forces stood
by and watched the looting take place spread throughout the
international press. Though initial reports contained inflated
figures, the publicity irreparably harmed the reputation of the
United States. In reaction to their outrage, the international
cultural property community called upon the United States to take
immediate steps to secure Iraq's remaining cultural treasures.
Recognizing the need for serious remedial measures, Congress
proposed two bills: the Iraq Cultural Heritage Protection Act'
[hereinafter H.R. 2009] and the Emergency Protection for Iraqi
Cultural Antiquities Act of 20032 [hereinafter S. 1291]. After
receiving feedback from the cultural property community, a third
bill3 was introduced in the House of Representatives that
1. Iraq Cultural Heritage Protection Act, H.R. 2009, 108th Cong. (2003).
2. Emergency Protection for Iraqi Cultural Antiquities Act of 2003, S. 1291,
108th Cong. (2003).
3. Iraq Cultural Heritage Protection Act, H.R. 3497, 108th Cong. (2003).
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effectively replaces H.R. 2009.
In this legislative update, I will discuss the history of Iraq's
antiquities, their regulation, and previous occurrences of antiquity
looting (I). Part I contains an explanation of the economics of the
international antiquities market. I will then explain the actual
looting and damage that took place at the National Museum in
Baghdad and that continues to take place at many archaeological
sites throughout Iraq (II). I will also address the public and foreign
policy concerns created by the looting in Iraq (II-D). I will explain
the current legal protections that the United States has in place,
noting their inadequacies (III & IV). Section III, regarding current
legal protections, explains the economic sanctions and the
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act. I will
discuss the contents of each bill and its possible effects, as well as
the interests of those parties that support and oppose each bill (V).
In my analysis of the proposed legislation, I will argue that neither
H.R. 2009 nor S. 1291 should be passed as currently proposed (VI-
A & B). Finally, I will discuss the reasons for my reserved support
of the most recent bill proposed in the House of Representatives
(VI-C &D).
I. HISTORY OF IRAQ'S ANTIQUITIES; LOOTING AND THE
INTERNATIONAL MARKET FOR ILLICIT CULTURAL PROPERTY
A. Mesopotamia and Iraq's Antiquities Laws
Within the borders of present day Iraq lies a plain nestled
between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers known as Mesopotamia:
the land between two rivers. Mesopotamia marks a beginning in
the history of human civilization and claims many firsts such as
the first cities, temples, codified religion, organized warfare, and
writing.4 The country of Iraq is home to many of the great
4. See John Malcolm Russell, Iraq in the Crosshairs, An Uncertain Future
for the Past, ICON WORLD MONUMENTS, Spring 2003. See also McGuire
Gibson, Where Civilization Began, ARCHAEOLOGY, July/Aug. 2003 at 20.
382 [Vol. XIII:381
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archaeological sites of the world such as: Ashur, Babylon, Hatra,
Khorsabad, Nimrud, Nineveh, Samarra, Ur, and Uruk' These
famous sites are only a few among the more than 10,000 registered
archaeological sites throughout Iraq.6
Iraq's cultural property remained relatively well-protected under
strict national antiquities laws from post-World War I until the
Persian Gulf War in 1991.' Under the Republic of Iraq's 1936
Antiquities Law No. 59, as amended in 1974 and 1975, Iraq
considered all antiquities not yet discovered to be property of the
State, regardless of the property ownership of the land.8 The law
"Iraq is not just a desert. It's the place where civilization began, it has the
longest surviving continuous tradition of civilization in the world, it's earlier
than Egypt, it's earlier than any place else, and we trace our own cultural roots
back to Mesopotamia." Id.
5. See John Malcolm Russell, Iraq in the Crosshairs, An Uncertain Future
for the Past, ICON WORLD MONUMENTS, Spring 2003, enumerating twenty-
seven of Iraq's most important sites. Ashur was the political and religious
center of Assyria and was the first well documented mercantile center. Id.
Babylon is the site of the Tower of Babel and the Ishtar Gate. Id. Hatra was a
very important ancient religious center. Id. Khorsabad was the Assyrian royal
capital. Jd. At Nimrud, a discovery of gold-filled tombs is considered to be one
of the greatest archaeology discoveries of all time. Id. Nineveh was the
imperial capital to the Biblical King Sennacherib. Id. Samarra, an Islamic
capital is home to the Great Mosque. Id. Ur is said to be the birthplace of
Abraham. Id. One of the best-preserved ziggurats is located at Ur. Id. Uruk
was the first large city of Mesopotamia and was the site of some of the earliest-
known writing. Id. See also Andrew Lawler, Saving Iraq's Treasures,
SMITHSONIAN, June 2003, Vol. 34, No. 3 at 42-55 for a more in depth history of
Uruk, Ashur, Babylon, Hatra, and Samarra.
6. Edmund L. Andrews, Iraqi Looters Tearing Up Archaeological Sites,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2003, at A l [hereinafter Looters Tearing Up Sites].
7. See McGuire Gibson, The Theft of Ancient Cities, NEWSDAY, Sept. 21,
2003 at A34, stating that, "The huge market in illegal antiquities did not exist at
all before the 1991 Gulf War, because Iraq had a strong antiquities law." See
also Norman Hammond, In the Fray: Time to Secure Iraq's Treasures....
WALL ST. J. EUR., April 17, 2003 at A7, stating that, "the new antiquities laws
put in place by Gertrude Bell after World War I ensured that the new Kingdom
of Iraq retained much of its heritage."
8. Antiquities Law No. 59 of 1936, 4th ed. ch. I, art. 3 and 4 (1976) (Iraq).
2003] 383
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prohibited private individuals from acquiring movable antiquities,9
discoveries of movable antiquities required government
notification within seven days,1" and the law prohibited the taking
of antiquities outside of Iraq." Furthermore, only the government
or groups authorized by the government were allowed to excavate
for antiquities, thus, even a private land owner could not excavate
his own land without an official permit. 2  All antiquities
discovered by excavators were considered property of the State. 3
The law made it strictly "forbidden to break, mutilate, destroy or
damage antiquities whether movable or immovable."' 4 Finally, the
antiquities laws provided strict criminal punishment of fines,
seizure and confiscation, and imprisonment for violators. 5
In efforts to provide greater protection for its cultural property,
Iraq joined international treaties and non-governmental
9. Id. at ch. III, art. 16 (1). It should be noted that Art 16(2) provided for
two exceptions: antiquities existing in palaces and ancient manuscripts. Id. at
art. 16(2). However the private possession of manuscripts was conditional upon
registration, conservation, and government approval for the transfer of
ownership. Id. at art. 16(3). The Directorate of Antiquities also had the right to
purchase any registered manuscript and to control or confiscate any that are lost
or mutilated due to negligence or intentional destruction. Id. at art. 16(6).
10. Id. at art. 17.
11. Id. atart. 26.
12. Id. at ch. V, art. 40.
13. Id. at art. 49.
14. Id. at ch. I, art. 5.
15. See generally id. at ch. VI on Penalties. Iraq amended the laws in 2002
creating stricter penalties and protections for antiquities. See Antiquities and
Heritage Law, No. 55 (2002) (Iraq). Protection for cultural heritage materials
(movable and fixed property or assets less than two-hundred years old that are
of historic, patriotic, national, religious, or artistic value) and for historic sites
were included to provide a much broader range of protection. The previous law
guaranteed protection for antiquities (objects two-hundred years or older), but
gave discretion to the Directorate to decide if an object of less than two-hundred
years would be considered an antiquity. The 2002 version of Iraq's antiquities
laws also significantly increased the available prison sentences and fines for
violators. Certain cases involving stolen antiquities impose life imprisonment
or the death penalty. See Antiquities and Heritage Law, No. 55 § 6 art. 40
(2002) (Iraq).
384
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organizations. Iraq accepted and, thus, became a State party to the
1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property [hereinafter the UNESCO Convention] in
December 1973.16 Iraq is also a State party to the Convention for
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
[hereinafter the Hague Convention] and its 1954 Protocol.
B. Concerns of Looting, Illicit Trade and the Persian Gulf
Experience
Due to the great quantity and quality of Iraq's cultural resources,
it is known as one of the great source countries on the international
antiquities market. 7 As a source country, Iraq is inherently at risk
of looting and pillage of its vast cultural property resources so long
as market countries such as the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Japan continue to demand those antiquities. 8
On the antiquities market, objects move in trade from their
country of origin, through several transit countries, until they reach
the art markets of western countries.'9 With each transfer of
16. See List of the 100 State Parties as at 27 June 2003, www.unesco.org
(2003) available at
http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/1970/html-eng/page3.shtml. Currently 100
countries are party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention. Id.
17. See generally Predita C. Rostomia, Looted Art in the U.S. Market, 55
RUTGERS L. REv. 271, 272 (2002), explaining that "peacetime looting of
antiquities occurs in countries that are rich in... antiquities and archaeological
sites, but poor in resources to stop the looting of.. .their cultural property."
18. See id. at 279, stating that "[m]arket nations are wealthier nations that
have a market for cultural objects of artistic value, while source nations are less
affluent nations that contain a plethora of such objects." See also id. at n. 9,
quoting John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property,
80 AM. J. INT'L. L. 831, 832 (1986). In footnote 9, Rostomia explains how the
antiquities market is created by a division of the world "into 'source nations and
market nations"' where the source nations are those that have a "supply of
desirable cultural property [that] exceeds the internal demand[.]" Id. The
market nations, conversely have a demand for antiquities that exceeds their own
supply. Id. Such a "condition 'encourages export from source nations[.]"' Id.
19. See Patty Gerstenblith, The Public Interest in the Restitution of Cultural
2003]
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ownership, the antiquity garners a higher purchase price until the
competitive market price is reached. Such price is attained when
the person willing and able to pay the highest price purchases the
article. Due to the high-demand and low-supply condition of
western country antiquity markets, western countries serve as the
end consumer in antiquity trade. Western countries are rich in
financial resources; therefore, they are able to pay the highest price
for antiquities. Additionally, western countries are generally poor
in their own antiquities and cultural resources, thus, they are also
willing to pay the highest price.2 ° Because of the low-supply, high-
demand condition, market country consumer demand heavily
influences the supply of antiquities on the international market.
The incentive to loot antiquities in source countries can also be
attributed to the fact that an increased supply does not decrease the
market price for antiquities.2 Market prices remain high for two
key reasons. The supply of antiquities is arguably finite and each
antiquity is itself unique. The supply of antiquities is considered
finite because it is not a renewable resource." Antiquities are
objects and object remnants produced by ancient cultures and
civilizations; therefore, the supply is limited to the amount of
objects produced by each civilization at some point in history. 3
Objects, Ownership and Protection of Heritage: Cultural Property Rights for
the 21" Century, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 197, 201 (2001), explaining that looted
objects of cultural heritage "move through the market from the looter to the
smuggler, eventually to auction houses and dealers, and finally to private
collectors and museums in major cities of Western Europe, North America, and
Asia." See generally Neil Brodie, Spoils of War: The plundering of Iraq's
cultural institutions demonstrates yet again how warfare fuels the global trade
in looted antiquities, ARCHAEOLOGY, July/Aug. at 18 (2003).
20. See Rostomia, supra note 17, at 272.
21. In a perfect market, if supply is increased and demand remains constant,
the market price will fall,
22. See Neil Brodie, et al., Stealing History: The Illicit Trade in Cultural
Material 1, 13-14 (The McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research
Cambridge 2000) [hereinafter Stealing History]. Brodie argues that "asset-
stripping the finite resource of cultural heritage is, by definition, unsustainable
in economic terms," and that cultural heritage is a non-renewable resource. Id.
23. Objects are classified as antiquities under the Convention when they are
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Antiquities enter the market upon discovery rather than through
the traditional process of manufacture in response to consumer
demand. Therefore, the current market supply can be increased by
increasing discovery, but the supply will, theoretically, diminish at
the point when all antiquities have been found. However, the
definition of an antiquity is dependant on the object's age; thus, it
is also arguable that every year a new supply of antiquities exists,
because each year more objects would qualify, by definition, as an
antiquity.24 Because antiquities collectors know that there is a
limited supply they are willing to pay premium prices.
Another factor that explains the international demand for
antiquities is the uniqueness inherent in each antiquity. Such
uniqueness increases its value to collectors because there are no
equal substitutes. Thus, unique objects for which there is a finite
supply are viewed as investment opportunities by collectors. This
fact, coupled with the willingness of collectors to pay premium
prices on the inflated world art market has caused the illicit trade
in antiquities to increase dramatically since the 1970s.2 5  When
there is a constant demand for antiquities and those demanding the
objects are willing to pay a premium price, looters in source
countries have an incentive to loot in order to meet the demand.26
of significant cultural importance to a country for archaeology, prehistory,
history, literature, art or science purposes and are more than one hundred years
old. See Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, UNESCO art.
1 (e) (1970) [hereinafter UNESCO Convention].
24. See supra note 24. See also 19 U.S.C.A. § 2601(2)(i) (2003) stating that
"no object may be considered to be an object of archaeological interest unless
such object is of cultural significance; is at least two hundred and fifty years
old..." And see H.R. 2009, 108th Cong. § 2(l), defining "archaeological
material of Iraq" as "any object or fragment or part of an object... that was first
found within the borders of Iraq... and that is at least 100 years old." Similarly,
Iraq's own antiquities law defines antiquities as "[m]ovable and fixed property
or assets, not less than two hundred years old, that were built, manufactured,
sculpted, produced, written, sketched, or photographed by man." Antiquities
and Heritage Law, No. 55 § 1, art. 4(7) (2002) (Iraq).
25. See Gerstenblith, supra note 19, at 202.
26. See id. at 211, explaining that "[b]ecause demand for antiquities is
2003] 387
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As a result of the structure of the antiquities market, looting and
the illicit trade of looted material occurs at epidemic levels.27 It
has also been suggested that the illicit trade in cultural material has
a relationship with the illegal drug market and the funding of
terrorism activities. 8
The incentive to loot archaeological sites and engage in illicit
trade of antiquities is further exaggerated when a source country is
in a state of economic turmoil and political unrest.29 Source
countries are generally economically poor, thus, as long as the
demand for antiquities on the global market remains constant,
looters in source countries have a financial incentive to find and
sell antiquities. Assuming that demand for antiquities exists, the
only deterrent to pillagers in economically-strapped source
increasing and the number of antiquities with documented provenience is finite,
sites are looted so as to increase supply and thereby satisfy the demand. The
only way to decrease the looting of sites is... to decrease the demand of
undocumented antiquities at the end-point of the market."
27. See Jodi Patt, The Need to Revamp Current Domestic Protection for
Cultural Property, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1207, 1208 (2002), stating that "[i]llicit
art trade is second only to narcotics trafficking as the largest and most profitable
type of illegal trade worldwide. The number of archaeological artifacts secretly
excavated and illegally exported every year continues to grow at an astounding
rate."
28. See Brodie, Stealing History, supra note 22, at 16, explaining that recent
reports have appeared to show that gangs dealing in drug smuggling and money
laundering are also dealing in antiquities. Brodie lists specific instances of drug
smuggling rings tied to trade in stolen antiquities. Id.
29. See Neil Brodie, Spoils of War: The plundering of Iraq's cultural
institutions demonstrates yet again how warfare fuels the global trade in looted
antiquities, ARCHAEOLOGY, July/Aug. at 16 (2003) [hereinafter Spoils of War].
Brodie, the coordinator of the Illicit Antiquities Research Center of the
McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research at the University of
Cambridge, discusses in this article how historically armed conflict in culture
rich source countries has resulted in the plundering of sites and museums. Id.
He specifically notes the Iraq situation after the Gulf War, the looting of
Afghanistan's National Museum and archaeological sites during the fighting
that erupted when the Soviets withdrew from Kabul, a renewed upsurge of site
looting in Afghanastan the fall of the Taliban, the looting of national museums
in Somalia during civil unrest in 1991, and the looting and partial destruction of
Angkor Wat, a famous site in Cambodia. Id. at 16-17.
388
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countries are strictly enforced domestic cultural property laws.
Political unrest in times of conflict renders such laws ineffective
leaving sites open for looting and pillage without criminal
consequence.
Both economic strife and lawlessness as a result of conflict were
present following the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and again at the
fall of the Saddam Hussein Regime during the War on Iraq in
2003.30 Following the Gulf war, illicit Iraqi antiquities emerged in
substantial amounts on the international market.3' In the three
years following the war, ten of Iraq's regional museums were
attacked, resulting in a loss of about three thousand objects.2
Looting also occurred at Iraq's archaeology sites and evidence of
such existed on the European market.33 From the end of the Gulf
War until the fall of the Saddam Regime in 2003, Iraqis
established illicit trade networks, identified transport routes, and
successfully learned how to smuggle.34 Iraq is said to have porous
borders because its "long land frontiers are difficult to police and
allow easy passage into Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and
Syria. '35  Thus, looted Iraqi antiquities flow easily out of their
country of origin and onto the world-wide market with an end
destination in Europe, the United States, or Japan.36
30. See Gerstenblith, supra note 19, at 202, stating that the movement of
cultural objects "often works in tandem with war and other misfortunes, as
attested by the considerable influx of Iraqi objects on the market that coincided
with the economic boycott following the Gulf War."
31. See Brodie, Spoils of War, supra note 29, at 16.
32. Id.
33. Id., explaining that, in "Europe dealers were circulating photographs of
relief fragments from palaces at Nineveh and Nimrud. Cuneiform tablets,
cylinder seals, and other small antiquities-more difficult to trace-were sold
openly."
34. See Brodie, Spoils of War, supra note 29, at 18.
35. Id.
36. See id., explaining the channels of trade from source countries to market
countries on the illicit antiquities market. "From Turkey material can move
directly to Europe, and from Saudi Arabia it can pass through the Gulf States to
Europe.. From Jordan material can be sent directly to Europe, or pass into
Israel, where there is a legal antiquities market." Id. "[M]aterial from Iraq will
2003] 389
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Although looted material is traded on the illicit market upon its
entry, many times these objects end up on the legitimate art market
due to the good faith purchaser laws of several European countries,
namely Switzerland.37 It is suspected that civil laws such as
Switzerland's that favor innocent purchasers have created a legal
loophole allowing "large quantities of stolen material to be
'laundered' by means of a good faith purchase.. .Switzerland, in
particular, has a thriving market in cultural material and objects
bought there can be sold legitimately in the UK or US. '38 Once
looters smuggle the illicit antiquities out of their country of origin
and into a jurisdiction with good faith purchaser laws, the antiquity
loses its bad title when it is purchased by a bona fide, good faith
buyer.39  The object can then be transferred to other buyers at
increased values without the subsequent buyers risking loss, due to
claims brought by the rightful owner."a Each transfer creates a
receipt or bill of sale, "which are virtually all that the major
auction houses require to show good title.'
The issue of good faith purchasers arose in Autocephalous
flow into Europe... and presumably then on to the markets in Europe, Japan,
and the United States." Id. "Large numbers of antiquities from Iraq, likely
looted, have been on open sale in Europe and America for the past ten years. .
Id.
37. See Thomas and Charles Danziger, Hot Stuff There's a lot of Stolen Art
Out There. As a buyer, how do you minimize your risk?, ART AND AUCTION,
July 2003, at 82, explaining that, under U.S. law, stolen works may indefinitely
be exposed to a claim by the original owner. However, in countries such as
Germany, France, and Switzerland which have good faith purchaser laws, "a
good faith purchaser may indeed acquire title from a thief, even against the
rightful owner... in Switzerland a bona fide purchaser obtains good title to a
stolen object if five years have elapsed since the theft." Id.
38. Brodie, Stealing History, supra note 22, at 33. Brodie further notes that
"[i]t is common to read in catalogues or advertisements that a piece is from a
collection long established in Switzerland... In fact the attribution 'property of a
Swiss gentleman' is regarded by some as a euphemism for 'illicit material."' Id.
39. See Jennifer H. Lehman, The Continued Struggle with Stolen Cultural
Property: The Hague Convention, The UNESCO Convention, and The
UNIDROIT Draft Convention, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 527, 529 (1997).
40. Id.
41. Id.
390 [Vol. XIII:381
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Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman Fine
Arts, Inc.42 The case illustrates the limitations of good faith
purchaser laws in purging the tainted title of stolen property.
Under Swiss law, a purchaser of stolen property acquires
title superior to that of the original owner only if he
purchases the property in good faith. Tr. 19 (von Mehren).
A bad faith purchaser of stolen property never acquires title.
As Professor von Mehren explained at trial, to conclude that
a purchaser did not act in good faith, a court must either find
that the purchaser actually knew that the seller lacked title,
or find that "an honest and careful purchaser in the particular
circumstances would have [had] doubts with respect to the
capacity of the seller to transfer property rights."
Swiss law presumes that a purchaser acts in good faith.
However, a plaintiff seeking to reclaim stolen property may
overcome this presumption. To do so he must show that
suspicious circumstances surrounded the transaction which
should have caused an honest and reasonably prudent
purchaser to doubt the seller's capacity to convey property
rights. If the plaintiff shows that the circumstances
surrounding the transaction should have created such doubt,
then the defendant purchaser has the burden of establishing
his good faith. A purchaser establishes his good faith by
showing that he took steps to inquire into the seller's
capacity to convey property rights and that such steps
reasonably resolved such doubt. 3
42. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989) [hereinafter
Church of Cyprus], aff'd 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
43. Church of Cyprus, 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1400 (citations omitted). The
Court found that the circumstances under which Goldberg purchased the
mosaics raised significant suspicions such that "an honest and reasonably
prudent purchaser in Goldberg's position [should have doubted the seller's]
capacity to convey property rights to the mosaics." Id. at 1402. Ultimately,
Goldberg had a duty to take reasonable steps to resolve the doubt created by
suspicious circumstances and her cursory inquiry into the seller's capacity to
2003]
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As the Church of Cyprus case illustrates, good faith purchaser
laws do have limits. Transacting the sale of antiquities in Swiss
free ports does not necessarily purge an illicit object's bad title.
Courts assess the good faith of a purchaser based on an objective
standard. The inquiry is not whether the purchaser believed that
the title was good, but whether the honest and reasonably prudent
purchaser would have reason to doubt the title's validity. If the
circumstances give rise to such objective doubt, then the purchaser
has an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to resolve that
doubt. Most importantly, where the purchaser suspects that the
object may have been stolen or illegally exported, the potential
purchaser should contact authorities in the article's country of
origin.
There are also several other sources that purchasers can contact
for information regarding a suspicious object. The International
Foundation for Art Research collects and maintains an updated
international registry of missing and stolen art objects. Interpol,
the international police organization, has information regarding
reported stolen objects.' These resources are helpful only to the
extent that an object is known to exist and is known to be missing
or to have been stolen. Objects looted from archaeological sites
complicate the inquiry. Such objects are not easily identified by
their country of origin because the objects' discovery was not
recorded and the objects have not been formally inventoried by a
museum or other institution. It may be difficult to determine the
proper country of origin where the object is not particularly
identifiable to a specific area or civilization. In the case of such
objects, receipts or bills of sale may be the only evidence available
making it difficult to determine whether good title ever existed.
Beyond the difficulties in tracing the source of illegally
excavated antiquities, removal from archaeological sites creates
convey property rights did not satisfy that duty. Id. at 1404. Thus, Goldberg
did not purchase the mosaics in good faith so the title remained tainted. See id.
44. ICOM created an Emergency Red List of Iraqi Antiquities at Risk for the
most significant Iraqi antiquities stolen from the National Museum in Baghdad.
See Emergency Red List of Iraqi Antiquities available at
http://icom.museum/redlist/irak/en/index.html.
392
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several other problems for the country of origin seeking to retain
and protect its cultural property. The first great concern of
scholars is the loss of context that occurs when archaeological sites
are looted.45 Looting by clandestine diggers removes objects from
the setting in which the object was found. The breadth of
contextual information available at the time of discovery is
permanently lost once the object is removed from its original
setting.
The second problem created by archaeological site looting and
the illicit trade of such objects is the emergence of fakes and
forgeries on the international market. Skillful forgers attempt to
take advantage of the high market prices that exist when the
available supply is low and the demand remains great by creating a
supply of fakes. Because objects that are looted directly from sites
have no record of their findspot, it is up to the buyer to be able to
discern genuine antiquities from fakes.46 This is not such a simple
task. Looters do not record the discovery of those looted objects;
therefore, the determination of genuineness must be made by an
expert.
Fakes are designed to fool the expert and clever forgers have
many techniques at their disposal - from simulating the
accretions of grime and soot that may build up on an object
stored for decades in the rafters of a smoky village hut, to
smearing pots with mud from genuine archaeological sites.
One Mexican forger was so successful that he was arrested
and accused of looting Pre-Columbian sites. Authorities
45. See Patt, supra note 27, at 1209, explaining that only scientific
excavation results in the appreciation of an object for its scientific, historic and
cultural values. The loss of context that results from careless, illegal excavation
prevents "archaeologists from reconstructing 'the functions of such objects, to
learn more about diet, technology, trade, settlement patterns, religion, literature
- in short, to learn about every aspect of a past society."' Id. quoting Patty
Gerstenblith, Ownership and Protection of Heritage: Cultural Property Rights
for the 21' Century: The Public Interest in the Restitution of Cultural Objects,
16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 197, 199 (2001).
46. See Brodie, Stealing History, supra note 22, at 17.
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released him only after a demonstration of his craft.47
As long as the demand, and thus the price, for antiquities
remains high, whether on the legitimate or the black market, there
will be an incentive for forgers to create fakes.
The third problem is one of economics. The original finder of
an antiquity that is traded on the illicit market receives less than
2% of the price paid by the final purchaser. 48 The structure of the
illicit market necessitates the use of several middlemen. Looters in
source countries do not have the means of negotiating a sale with
the final purchasers in large market countries. Furthermore, those
purchasers would never purchase directly from a source highly
suspect of looting because of the inherent risk of the title being
invalid. End purchasers buy antiquities only after they have
developed a provenance legitimized through several previous
transactions. Traders move the antiquities quickly out of the
source country and into several intermediate countries before
offering it for sale to purchasers in market countries. The price
paid by each middleman increases at each stage of the trading
process. Thus, the middlemen make a substantially higher profit
from the sale of the antiquity than its original finder.
Limited economic beneficiaries are another related problem
stemming from the disparate profit margins of the illicit antiquities
47. Id. Brodie also explains another case where the J Paul Getty Museum
bought a marble statue supposedly dating to the 6 th century BC. Id. at 18. The
statue carried no provenance, and its accompanying documentation turned out to
be false. Id. The Museum sought expert opinions from nineteen art historians
and scientists. Id. The group concluded that they could not determine the
authenticity of the statue. Id.
48. See Brodie, Stealing History, supra note 22, at 13-14. "It is clear that in
all cases over 98% of the final price was destined to end up in the pockets of the
middlemen; the original finder received very little and the final buyer can hardly
claim to have obtained a bargain." Id. at 13. See also Gerstenblith, supra note
19, at 226. "To the extent that the sale of looted artifacts benefits the local
population, this economic benefit is dwarfed by the gains made by the
middlemen in the later sequences of an object's movement from point of
discovery ultimately to private collector or museum in the United States or
Western Europe." Id.
394
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market. In the source country, only the actual looter stands to
receive economic benefit from his sale of antiquities. This benefit
is relatively minimal yet must necessarily be sufficient to him as
an individual to incite him to continue to loot and illicitly sell the
antiquities. In the context of countries under severe economic
depression it is easy to see how individual gains, though minimal,
would be sufficient incentive especially when the looter receives
enough money from such activity to provide food and shelter for
himself and for his family.
On the other hand, the middlemen traders reap large economic
benefits. Intermediate countries are not typically stricken with
poverty. Thus, the middlemen trade purely for personal profit.
Furthermore, the economic benefits, though they are initially only
incurred by a few individuals, spread to the general economy of
the middleman's country when the traders spend their profits.
With 98% of the profits for every sale of illicit antiquities going to
the middlemen, the countries in which these traders live receive a
great windfall of international funds that they would not receive
but for the illegal trading. These countries do not have much
incentive to prevent the illegal movement of antiquities through
their borders because they incidentally receive economic benefits
from the trade and they do not have any emotive ties to the cultural
property of another country's culture.
Where illicit trafficking in antiquities creates only a few
individual economic beneficiaries in the source country with the
majority of profits going to benefit middlemen and incidentally the
middlemen's countries, the opposite effect would exist if the
antiquities remained within the borders of the country of origin.
Antiquities that remain in the source country can be a great
revenue generating source over an extensive length of time as they
increase tourism, science and education, all of which are benefits
to the nation as a whole and not just to one individual.49
49. See Gertenblith, supra note 19, at 226, explaining that "local museums
and cultural tourism provide a sustainable form of economic benefit to local
populations."
2003]
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C. Iraq's Antiquities in the United States
Within just a few weeks of the initial museum looting, art
collectors and dealers in the United States began receiving queries
about Iraqi artifacts." The FBI expected that the "the thieves
[would] attempt to sell most of the stolen pieces in wealthy
countries such as the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan,
France and Switzerland. Collectors in the United States buy about
60% of the world's art, both legal and illegal."'"
The international market for art, artifacts and antiquities
surpasses the billion dollar level. 2 It has been estimated that the
illicit trade in antiquities world-wide is between $150 million and
$2 billion per year. 3 Sotheby's, one of the world's leading art
auction houses, sells approximately 100,000 objects every year; of
those, only a fraction of 1% are from the area comprising current
day Iraq.54 The most commonly sold Iraqi antiquity in the United
States is the cylinder seal,55 which garners a low price relative to
the entire art market. The record price for a cylinder seal
originating from this area and sold at Sotheby's New York auction
house was $143,000.56 However, the average U.S. market price
50. FBI: Looted Iraq Antiquities Surfacing On World Art Markets, Dow
JONES INT'L NEWS, April 21, 2003.
51. Id. quoting Lynne Chaffinch, manager of the FBI Art Theft Program.
52. Jennifer H. Lehman, The Continued Struggle with Stolen Cultural
Property: The Hague Convention, The UNESCO Convention, and The
UNIDROIT Draft Convention, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 527, 527 (1997).
53. Brodie, Stealing History, supra note 22, at 23. Due to the secretive and
clandestine nature of illicit trade, reliable data is difficult to obtain. Id.
54. Letter from Mathew Weigman, Director, Sotheby's New York Press
Office, to Karin E. Borke, Staff Writer, DePaul University College of Law
Journal of Art and Entertainment Law (July 25, 2003).
55. A cylinder seal is a cylindrical piece of stone "engraved in intaglio and
used especially in ancient Mesopotamia to roll an impression on wet clay."
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available at http://www.webster.com/cgi-
bin/dictionary (2003).
56. See Letter from Mathew Weigman, Director, Sotheby's New York Press
Office, to Karin E. Borke, Staff Writer, DePaul University College of Law
Journal of Art and Entertainment Law (July 25, 2003), stating that, "[t]he
highest prices for Sumerian (southern Iraq) in New York are probably for the
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for a Sumerian cylinder seal is approximately $400."7 Revenue
from legitimate sales of Iraqi antiquities on the U.S. art market is
relatively insignificant. It is difficult to estimate the total market
existing in the United States for trade in Iraqi antiquities. Data of
transactions made and revenue generated from illegitimate sales is
unknown because of the secretive nature of the black market.
Furthermore, there exists an overlap of markets where, "[t]hieves
usually attempt to sell stolen art and artifacts on the legal
market."58
II. ACTUAL LOOTING OF IRAQ'S NATIONAL TREASURES
RESULTING FROM THE 2003 WAR ON IRAQ
A. Cultural Property Experts Issue a Pre- War Warning to the
U.S. Military
Recognizing the danger of the past repeating itself, several
cylinder seals from the Ada Small Moore Collection of Ancient Near Eastern
Art, sold by Sotheby's on December 12, 1991. In that sale an Akkadian Lapis
Lazuli Cylinder Seal.. .brought the record price for a cylinder seal at auction of
$143,000." It should also be noted that Christies New York auction house sold
a cylinder seal from Western Asia for $424,000 in June 2001. See Exceptional
Prices, www.christies.com, at
http://www.christies.com/departments/exceptionalprices.asp?DID=6 (November
2003).
57. A search of Sotheby's online archives using the keywords "Sumerian"
and "antiquities" produced 65 lots sold at the New York auction house over the
last five years. Of those 65 lots, 41 (63%) were comprised of cylinder seals.
One hundred fourteen seals were sold for a total of $46, 971, resulting in an
average closing bid of $412.03 per cylinder seal. In the five-year period from
1998-2003, the highest closing bid for one seal was $5,462 on June 4, 1998, for
a Sumerian Lapis Lazuli Cylinder Seal with Contest Scene, Early Dynastic
11/111, circa 2700-2400 B.C. The lowest price paid per seal in that five-year
period was $65.71 when the closing bid was $460 for Seven Sumerian
Limestone and Alabaster Cylinder Seals, Jemdet Nasr Period, circa 3100-2900
B.C. also on June 4, 1998.
58. FBI, supra note 50. The FBI usually gets information regarding stolen
objects on the market when dealers or experts report suspect artifacts. Id.
2003]
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members of the art, archaeological and cultural property
community advised the U.S. Department of Defense regarding the
protection of Iraqi's priceless antiquities. 9 As early as December
2002, the United States enlisted a team of experts under the
direction of McGuire Gibson, an archaeologist from the University
of Chicago, to catalogue information about the location of
historical and archaeological sites throughout Iraq.6" The concern
is not just for the protection of patrimony of interest to the people
of Iraq, but that the antiquities are of interest to the history of
civilization and thus of interest to much of the modern world.6'
With over 10,000 archaeological sites throughout the country,
almost the entire country is an archaeological site.62 With the very
real danger of cultural property destruction in mind, rival groups of
academics, curators, and collectors all scrambled to influence the
State Department and Pentagon officials regarding the
minimization of destruction and looting of cultural property in the
event of war.63 Gibson and his group of experts gave the Pentagon
a detailed list of 4,000 Iraqi sites that needed to be protected and
later added another 1,000 to that list.'
Beyond the fear of site destruction from military combat, the
experts also emphasized that the "museum was the single most
59. Bowen, infra note 62, at P12. "[R]ecalling the belated and flawed
communication between the US government and experts during the 1991 Gulf
War, the experts 'want to point out what happened in the past and try to suggest
ways in which we can avoid that, if at all possible, or at least to mitigate the
consequences."' Id. quoting Jane Waldbaum, AIA president.
60. See Patrick Anidjar, Conundrum for US Forces: how to conquer Iraq, but
leave its treasures intact. AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, December 24, 2002.
61. Id.
62. See Ted Bowen, Caught in the line offire - Archaeology Iraq - War may
well see the destruction of thousands .. , FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at
P12.
63. Id.
64. Id. See also, Gibson supra note 4, at 20, explaining that "they put those
[sites] into their computers, into their mapping systems. And I know the
military made an effort not to destroy sites. They had a special list of 150 sites
on the "do not target" list that included all the famous ones you can think of and
a lot of others."
398
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important archaeological location in the country."65  The
Archaeological Institute of America (AIA) additionally urged the
government to "observe international treaties on cultural property,
to work to minimize damage to archaeological sites and artefacts,
[sic] to prevent looting, and to facilitate the preservation of Iraqi
cultural heritage in the wake of any conflict."66
B. Actual Looting at The National Museum in Baghdad
The looting of Iraq's National Museum in Baghdad occurred
between April 9 and April 12, 2003, as U.S. forces entered
Baghdad in the final days of the war.67 Prior to the war, museum
staff moved many of the most important pieces out of the National
Museum in Baghdad and into safe bank vaults and other secure
hidden locations.68 The objects left in the galleries were either too
large or too fragile to move or they were permanently attached to
their gallery displays.69 Among the most important items taken by
looters from the museum were the Warka Vase and the marble
face of a woman, both from Uruk.7° Each of these items has
subsequently been returned.7' The looters removed the Akkadian
copper statute from Bassetki, that weighs several hundred pounds,
by dragging it down several stairs damaging both the statue and
the museum.72 Looters also damaged and destroyed many other
65. Gibson, supra note 4, at 20.
66. Bowen, supra note 62, at P12.
67. Gugliotta, infra note 81, at A10.
68. John Malcolm Russell, We're Still Missing the Looting Picture, THE
WASHINGTON POST, June 15, 2003, at B05.
69. Id.
70. Id. See also John M. Russell, A Personal Account of the First UNESCO
Cultural Heritage Mission to Baghdad, May 16-20, 2003, Archaeological
Institute of America, Aug. 2003, at 4, explaining that the foot of the Warka vase
remained attached to its pedestal, evidence that the looters broke the vase free.
71. See Gugliotta, infra note 82, at A 10, stating that Warka Vase had been
returned. As of July 28, 2003, of the 40 objects stolen from the galleries, 10 had
been recovered. Russell, supra note 70, at 5.
72. See Russell, supra note 70, at 4. As of November 11, 2003 the Bassetki
statue along with about 800 other smaller objects had been returned through the
2003] 399
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objects and then left them behind.73 The administrative offices
were also completely emptied of furniture and equipment.74 Many
paintings in the administrative offices were badly damaged.75 The
looters also took many small objects including cylinder seals and
jewelry from one of the basement rooms, including an entire
collection of cylinder seals totaling 4,795.76
Aside from priceless gallery items, the looters also raided three
of the museum's five store rooms.77  The store rooms held the
museum's study collection."
The Iraq museum is a national archeological museum,
which means everything excavated in Iraq goes
there... [T]he vast majority [of these objects] went into the
museum's study collection... [and] were of equal
importance to those on display. That's because groups of
objects tell the story of the people who left them there in a
way that an individual object.., exhibited on its own simply
cannot.79
Furthermore, many of the objects in the study collection may not
yet have been inventoried by the museum. It is estimated that
between 2,100 and 12,000 objects are missing from the store
rooms 80
The Coalition responded to the museum looting by creating an
amnesty program to induce the return of looted objects.8 Under
amnesty program. See Rebecca Bouchebel, Hundreds of looted items returned
to Iraqi museum, Centerpiece is 4,300-year-old copper statue, CNN.com, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/I11 / 11/sprj.nilaw.antiquities.retumed/
index.html (November 11, 2003).
73. Russell, supra note 70, at 5.
74. Id. at 6.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 9.
77. Russell, supra note 68, at B05.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Russell, supra note 68, at B05.
81. See Guy Gugliotta, Iraq Museum is Slowly Recovering Artifacts, THE
[Vol. XIII:381400
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the program people could return objects with no risk of criminal or
civil prosecution.82 On July 11, 2003, Colonel Matthew Bogdanos
reported that,
about 2,260 objects stolen from the museum had been
recovered within Iraq thanks to an amnesty program and
police work. Most of these are from the old magazine, and
many are replicas and forgeries. None of the 10,337 objects
stolen from the basement storerooms - all of them genuine
and many of them extremely valuable and easily marketable
- had been recovered in Iraq.83
The fact that the valuable, genuine objects taken from the
basement rooms have not been returned supports Colonel
Bogdanos' conclusion that the theft in those rooms was committed
by professionals.84 By September 15, 2003, Colonel Bogdanos
stated that 3,411 items had been recovered under the amnesty
program, but that more than 10,000 were still missing.85
C. Actual Looting at Iraqi Archaeological Sites
It has been said that "the greatest cultural disaster of the war
happened in southern Iraq, where looters plundered major
archaeological sites."86  Ambassador Pietro Cordone toured the
sites in May and reported that dozens, sometimes hundreds, of
clandestine diggers were at the sites taking only objects that would
sell well on the export market and discarding the rest.87 In April,
Iraqi officials requested that the American military assist in the
protection of many archaeological sites.88 Military officials did
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 15, 2003, at A10.
82. Id.
83. Russell, supra note 70, at 14.
84. Id.
85. Gugliotta, supra note 81, at A10.
86. Russell, supra note 68, at B05.
87. Id.
88. Edmund L. Andrews, Iraqi Officials Say Looting of Ancient Sites
2003]
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protect a few of the most famous sites such as Babylon, however,
the vast majority remain unprotected.89
Marine officials stated that "protecting archaeological treasures
was merely one of many priorities, and not necessarily on the top"
in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam's regime.9" Lt. Col. Richard
S. Long stated that, "[y]ou have to put the securing of those
archaeological sites within the mosaic of ensuring food, water,
electricity, sewage and other types of basic needs."9  There is
simply not enough military man power to set up guards at all of the
sites. It was suggested that the military could arm the Iraqi guards,
however, "[e]xperts and local Iraqis say many guards had
themselves become collaborators and even organizers of the
looters."92 The situation reflects the larger problem of anarchy that
existed in Iraq following the fall of Saddam's regime. It is the
absence of law and law enforcement that gave rise to the looting.93
Without fear of legal consequences, local looters were free to
take advantage of the great potential for immediate wealth. One
reporter met with a local dealer who was able to produce a small
bronze statue potentially worth thousands if it proved to be
authentic, as well as several other ancient artifacts including
cuneiform tablets and cylinder seals. 4  The dealer offered
everything for sale at prices of $1,500 and up.95 The dealer also
stated that he had "more than a thousand tablets. I have big statues
made of stone. Just tell me what you want, and I can show it to
you.'"96 All of the items had been stolen from archaeological sites
in southern Iraq.9" The local dealers' prices illustrate the profit
Continues Despite Pleas to U.S. Troops for Help, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2003, at
A 14 [hereinafter Looting Continues Despite Pleas].
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Andrews, Looting Continues Despite Pleas, supra note 88.
93. Id.
94. Edmund L. Andrews, Global Network Aids Theft of Iraqi Artifacts, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 2003, at A12 [hereinafter Network Aids Theft].
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. Other large scale objects such as "[fWull-sized urns, some packed with
402 [Vol. XIII:381
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incentive to loot as well as the profit margin problem when viewed
in context of the world-wide art market. "[A] single sale of $2,000
is more than what many people earn in a year. But experts say the
prices demanded... are a fraction of what those objects can fetch in
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Europe and the United States."98
The archaeological concern is that looters destroy the ability of
scientists to gain information from the context in which the objects
are found.99 Furthermore, the rudimentary and reckless digging is
destructive to the artifacts, often damaging them in the process of
removal. t'0 Archaeologist Susanne Osthoff stated that, at Isin,
"[i]n two weeks, they have ruined all the work that was done over
15 years."
D. Public and Foreign Policy Concerns Surrounding the U.S.
Failure to Protect Iraq's Antiquities.
Though the military failed to immediately secure the Museum,
Library, and many archaeological sites, it did respond quickly to
the public outcry and subsequently secured the Museum.
However, the looting that occurred while the museum was
unprotected irreparably hurt the U.S. reputation. "The looting was
a public relations disaster for the United States, which was sharply
criticized for ignoring the pillagers as they charged through the
museum."'' Much of the international outrage stemmed from the
fact that the United States failed to prevent a predictable disaster.
Due to warnings from the cultural property community prior to the
cuneiform tablets, are being dug up daily at sites like isin and Chokha, a site to
the south of Afak that [the dealer] said was his primary source of merchandise."
Id.
98. Id.
99. See Andrews, Looters Tearing Up Sites, supra note 6. Dr. Donny
George, of the Iraqi State Board of Antiquities stated that, "[i]f you find an
artifact but you don't have the context, you lose 80 to 90 percent of the
information." Id.
100. See id. (explaining that swarms of looters were digging around the
clock at Isin with shovels, knives, and semiautomatic weapons).
101. Gugliotta, supra note 81, atA10.
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conflict, the United States had sufficient knowledge of the great
international interest in and the importance of protecting Iraq's
many cultural treasures. At a Pentagon briefing in mid-April, U.S.
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld addressed the Defense
Department's failure to adequately protect Iraq's antiquities.0 2
Looting is an unfortunate thing. Human beings are not
perfect. And we've seen looting in this country. We've
seen riots at soccer games and various countries around the
world. We've seen destruction after athletic events in our
own country. No one likes it. No one allows it. It happens.
And it's unfortunate. And to the extent it can be stopped, it
should be stopped.
To the extent it happens in warzone, it's difficult to stop.
The United States is concerned about the museum in
Baghdad, and the president and the secretary of state and I
have all talked about it, and we are in the process of offering
rewards for people who will bring things back, or to assist us
in finding where those things might be."0 3
In the wake of the media coverage of the Museum's looting, the
United States faced a serious international relations crisis. One
commentator noted that,
as the White House has learned in the aftermath of war in
Iraq, art is a mighty weapon in the battle for hearts and
minds. Lose or abuse the treasures of ancient civilizations,
or fail to prevent others from doing damage, and incur a
blast of international disapproval. Preserve artifacts and
share the heritage of humankind, and perhaps, over time,
even a foreign invader may gain respect.0 4
102. Kyra Phillips, Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Myers hold Pentagon
briefing, CNN Int'l: Special Events, April 15, 2003.
103. Id.
104. Linda Hales, The Art of Recovery; In Iraq, an Exhibition to Counter
Images of War and Loss, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 28, 2003, at CO 1.
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It is clear that the United States needs to take affirmative steps to
remedy the Iraqi antiquity situation in order to regain international
respect. The implementation of legislation to prevent the
importation of Iraq's antiquities into the United States is one such
measure that Congress is actively pursuing.
III. CURRENT U.S. LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR IRAQ'S CULTURAL
PROPERTY
In this section I will discuss two of the sources of protection for
Iraq's antiquities under current U.S. law." 5 I will explain in detail
the history, purpose, and legal application of the Convention on
Cultural Property Implementation Act [hereinafter CPIA] because
it is the most significant protective device for international cultural
property under U.S. law. Furthermore, the House of
Representative's bill, H.R. 2009, proposes three amendments to
the CPIA. Thus, it is necessary to be familiar with the legislative
history of the CPIA in order to understand the significance of
possibly amending this historical piece of legislation. I will then
explain the inadequacies of the two legal structures currently
available.
A. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control
Economic Sanctions
The United States imposed economic sanctions on Iraq pursuant
to Executive Orders 12722 and 12744 when Iraq invaded Kuwait
105. A third source of protection for stolen property in the United States is
the National Stolen Property Act. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2315 (2003) [hereinafter
NSPA]. In U.S. v. Schultz, the 2nd Circuit recently upheld the McClain doctrine
holding that the NSPA applies to property "stolen" from a foreign country,
where the object's "stolen" status is based on the patrimony laws of the foreign
country. U.S. v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2nd Cir. 2003), see also U.S. v.
McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977). However, I will not address this avenue
of protecting Iraq's cultural property because it falls outside the scope of this
legislative update.
2003)
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in August of 1990.106 The economic sanctions included a
"complete trade embargo which automatically prohibited trade in
Iraqi antiquities."'' 7  The United Nations Security Council also
called on UN members to impose economic sanctions on Iraq
pursuant to Resolution 661.1"8 Congress authorized the President
to comply with the UN sanction recommendations pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act [hereinafter
IEEPA].'0 9 Section 586 of IEEPA is the Iraq Sanctions Act of
1990 that grants the President specific authority to comply with
UN sanction recommendations and to impose trade embargos
against Iraq." 0 The Iraqi Sanctions Regulations are administered
by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control
[hereinafter OFAC]. "'
On May 22, 2003, the UN Security Council lifted most
economic sanctions on Iraq by adopting Resolution 1483.112 The
Resolution "also provided that Member States should establish a
prohibition on trade in archaeological, cultural, historical,
religious, and rare scientific items of Iraq, that may have been
illegally removed from the country since the adoption of
Resolution 661 back in 1990. ' ' 113 OFAC implemented the UN
106. S. 1291 pmbl., 108th Cong. (2003).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (2003). This Act falls under the War and National
Defense chapter of the U.S. Code.
110. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701, sec. 586 (2003).
111. Id.
112. Id. See also UN Security Council Lifts Iraq Sanctions at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/05/22/sprj.irq.main (May 22, 2003),
explaining the unanimous vote to lift the sanctions.
John Negroponte, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said that
'it is time for the Iraqi people to benefit from their natural resources'
after being frozen out of the world's economy under Saddam Hussein's
rule. The resolution requires a one-year review, a step sought by
Germany and France so that the U.S.-led power of authority would not
be open-ended. Id.
113. S. 1291 pmbl., 108th Cong. (2003). See also, U.N. Security Council
Ends Economic Sanctions on Iraq, May 22, 2003, available at
http://www.usembassy.it/file2003_05/alia/A3052204.htm (May 22, 2003). "The
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Security Council's new Resolution the following day by issuing a
general license to lift most of the U.S. trade sanctions on Iraq,
while continuing to ban trade in looted Iraqi antiquities." 4
The current OFAC sanction on Iraq's antiquities is not
indefinite. If the conditions that provided the legal basis for the
sanctions no longer exist, then the sanction must be lifted. "[T]he
legal authority for OFAC's continuing restrictions on trade in Iraqi
antiquities derives from the Executive Orders issued in 1990,
which are... premised upon the existence of emergency conditions
[in] Iraq.""' Thus, the OFAC sanctions may be lifted at any time
subject to a Presidential determination that emergency conditions
no longer exist."6
B. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act
The United States has historically resisted international pressure
to broaden restrictions on the importation of art from foreign
countries." 7 The United States "resisted vehemently" the original
council also called upon nations to respond to humanitarian appeals, to deny
safe haven to the members of Saddam Hussein's regime who are alleged to be
responsible for crimes and atrocities, and to take steps to facilitate the return of
Iraqi cultural property." Id. See also U.N. SCOR, 4761st mtg. at 3, 7, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003).
Decides that all Member States shall take appropriate steps to facilitate
the safe return to Iraqi institutions of Iraqi cultural property and other
items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, and religious
importance illegally removed from the Iraq National Museum, the
National Library, and other locations in Iraq since the adoption of
resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, including by establishing a
prohibition on trade in or transfer of such items and items with respect to
which reasonable suspicion exists that they have been illegally removed,
and calls upon the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization, Interpol, and other international organizations, as
appropriate, to assist in the implementation of this paragraph[.] Id.
114. S. 1291 pmbl., 108th Cong. (2003).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See U.S. v. McClain, 545 F.2d. 988, 997, n.14 (5th Cir. 1977). In
footnote 14, Circuit Judge Wisdom discusses the legislative history of certain art
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1969 draft of the UNESCO Convention, because it would require
signatory States to commit "themselves to make it illegal under
their own law to import all art works exported without an export
certificate from the territory of another party to the Convention."'18
The United States was successful in changing the mandatory
import provision to a provision calling for "concerted international
action, including import controls, only when needed in 'crisis'
situations.""' 9  The Senate approved the revised UNESCO
Convention subject to certain reservations. 2 ° The United States
ratified the UNESCO Convention in 1972 and formally
implemented it through legislation in 1983, becoming the first
market nation to do so.' 2'
U.S. participation in the UNESCO Convention plays an
important role in U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. Department of
State provided the following statement regarding its participation
in the Convention:
The legislation is important to our foreign relations,
including our international cultural relations. The expanding
worldwide trade in objects of archaeological and
import statutes to explain the policy behind the general rule in the United States
and in most art-importing countries, that "it is not a violation of law to import
simply because an item has been illegally exported from another country. This
is a fundamental general rule today with respect to art importation .... This
means that a person who imports a work of art which has been illegally exported
is not for that reason alone actionable, and the possession of that work cannot
for that reason alone be disturbed in the United States." Id. at 996.
118. Id. at 997 n.14.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See U.S. v. An Original Manuscript Dated November 19, 1778, 1999
WL 97894 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) at *3 [hereinafter Original Manuscript]. See also
List of the 100 State Parties as at 27 June 2003, www.unesco.org (2003)
available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/1970/html_eng/page3.shtml.
And see Lehman, supra note 39, at 539, explaining that in 1997 the U.S. was the
first and only market nation to implement the Convention. Today, however, the
United Kingdom (in 2002) and France (in 1997) have both ratified the
Convention and Japan (in 2002) has accepted it.
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ethnological interest has led to wholesale
depredation.. .resulting in the mutilation of.. .archaeological
complexes of ancient civilizations... In addition, art objects
have been stolen in increasing quantities from museums,
churches, and collections. . . the appearance in the United
States of [illicitly exported or stolen] objects has often given
rise to outcries and urgent requests for return by other
countries. The United States considers that on grounds of
principle, good relations, and concern for the preservation of
the cultural heritage of mankind, it should render assistance
in these situations.1
22
To date, one hundred countries are party to the UNESCO
Convention.123 However, market nations have been slow to accede
to the UNESCO Convention out of reluctance to restrict their art
markets. 24  Only recently did France, the United Kingdom, and
Japan become State Parties. 25  The UNESCO Convention
"prohibits the importation of cultural property illegally exported or
stolen from a foreign nation."' 26  But the UNESCO Convention
also imposes an obligation on its member states to protect their
own cultural property internally.' 27 This is a significant aspect of
the UNESCO Convention, because it "encourages national
122. See Frequently Asked Questions at
http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/faqs.html.
123. See id. See also List of the 100 State Parties as at 27 June 2003,
www.unesco.org (2003) available at
http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/1970/html-eng/page3.shtml.
124. Lehman, supra note 39, at 540. See also Patt, supra note 27, at 1222,
quoting Jennifer Sultan, Comment, Combating the Illicit Art Trade in the
European Union: Europol's Role in Recovering Stolen Artwork, 18 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 759, 776-77 (1998). Western European nations with large art markets
are reluctant to join "because it 'conflicts with common market regulations; that
it would force them to return items housed in their museums; and that they are
capable of preventing looting of their own archaeological sites without the
Convention's assistance."' Id.
125. See supra note 121.
126. Lehman, supra note 39, at 539.
127. See id. at 540.
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protection measures, rather than international enforcement. 12 8
The UNESCO Convention seeks to stop pillaging, looting, and
the theft of cultural property by regulating the trade of
international cultural property. 12 9 Its focus is on private conduct,
primarily during peacetime. 130 After ten years of debate, Congress
passed the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act as
a somewhat restrictive ratification of the UNESCO Convention in
December 1982, and the bill was signed by President Regan on
January 12, 1983.131 The CPIA codified Articles 7(b) and 9 of the
1970 UNESCO Convention into U.S. law. 32 The CPIA is civil
customs and import law codified in the "Customs Duties" title of
the U.S. Code. 133
The purpose of the CPIA was to "achieve 'greater international
cooperation towards preserving cultural treasures that not only are
of importance to the nations whence they originate, but also to
128. See Patt, supra note 27, at 1220, further explaining that the Convention,
instead of creating standard, international export controls, requires signatories to
introduce domestic export controls to prevent the illicit export of their own
cultural property.
129. See Lehman, supra note 39, at 539, remarking that "it must be
understood that 'the 1970 Convention did not emerge suddenly within the
context of UNESCO. It was the end product of a long line of efforts to stop the
pillaging and looting of archaeological sites, and theft of cultural property of
extreme importance."' Id., quoting Lyndel V. Prott, International Control of
Illicit Movement of the Cultural Heritage: The 1970 UNESCO Convention and
Some Possible Alternatives, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 333, 338 (1983).
130. See Original Manuscript, supra note 121 at *3. This is in contrast to
the Hague Convention that focuses on protecting cultural property during times
of armed conflict.
131. See Daniel W. Eck, et al., International Cultural Property:
International Legal Developments in Review: 2001 Public International Law,
36 INT'L LAW. 607, 609 (2002).
132. See Original Manuscript, supra note 121 at *3, stating that "[t]his Act,
19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2613, focuses primarily on implementation of Articles
7(b) and 9 of the UNESCO Convention, which call for concerted action among
nations to prevent trade in specific items of cultural property in emergency
situations."
133. See 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2613 (2003). The CPIA is codified under
Title 19: Customs Duties.
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greater international understanding of our common heritage."" ' 34
One commentator states that the enactment of the CPIA
represented the United States' recognition of "the fact that free
trade in cultural property has resulted in pillage of archaeological
and ethnological materials and had deprived many nations of their
cultural heritage."135 This implies that the purpose of the CPIA is
to restrict trade in cultural property in order to curtail pillage and
to preserve cultural heritage in its country of origin. However, in
his concurring opinion in Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church
of Cyprus, Circuit Judge Cudahy reasoned that,
[t]he delay in the enactment of the [CPIA] apparently was
caused, in part, by pressure from art dealers and traders, who
argued that if the United States undertook unilateral import
controls, illegal cultural property would simply be sold to
those art market countries lacking similar import controls.
In fact, the [CPIA] was perhaps finally enacted only because
it was perceived as a restraint of sorts on certain Customs
officers.. .The [CPIA], therefore, emphasized the need for
concerted action and, in particular, seemed to prefer action
resulting from bilateral treaties between the United States
and the affected source countries.'36
At the time the CPIA was enacted, certain customs officers,
relying on the National Stolen Property Act, were seizing
archaeological material from foreign nations that had vesting laws
134. U.S. v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 408 (2nd Cir. 2003), quoting S. REP. No.
97-564, at 21 (1982).
135. Eck, supra note 131, at 609.
136. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and
Feldman Fine Arts, 917 F.2d 278, 297 (7th Cir. 1990). In Autocephalous
Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus, the Church brought suit to recover stolen
mosaics under Indiana's replevin laws. The court discussed certain U.S.
international agreements regarding cultural property to illustrate U.S. policy.
Though the CPIA was not directly applicable in this case, the court stated that
"the policy that the Act embodies is clear: at the very least, we should not
sanction illegal traffic in stolen cultural property that is clearly documented as
belonging to a public or religious institution." Id.
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by claiming that it was "stolen."' 137 After the McClain decision,
U.S. Customs issued a directive that allowed the seizure of
archaeological material coming from those countries that had
national vesting laws. 3 8 The dealer community thought the CPIA
would help eliminate such practices by providing import
restrictions on cultural property only to those States that entered
bilateral trade agreements with the United States and on objects
documented as belonging to and stolen from religious or public
institutions of States party to the UNESCO Convention.'39 As a
result, the CPIA created bright line categories of archaeological
material subject to seizure. However, the enactment of § 2607
eliminated the need to prove the mens rea of "knowledge" under
the NSPA by allowing Customs to seize all cultural objects stolen
from public institutions.4 ° Thus the CPIA did not really change
the actions of U.S. Customs officers.
Pursuant to Article 9 of the UNESCO Convention, the CPIA
allows the United States to participate in international protection of
cultural property by proving a means for source countries to enter
bilateral or multilateral trade agreements with the United States,
whereby United States Customs officers enforce import
restrictions on the cultural property of the foreign nation.'4' And in
certain emergency situations, the CPIA authorizes the President to
impose unilateral import restrictions on the cultural property of the
requesting State.'42 Pursuant to Article 7(b) of the Convention, the
CPIA also provides for blanket protection of stolen cultural
property "documented as appertaining to the inventory of a
museum or religious or secular public monument or similar
137. Id.
138. See U.S. v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977), holding that
Mexico's laws vested the country of Mexico with ownership of the pre-
Columbian artifacts and that the illegal exportation of the artifacts from Mexico
rendered them "stolen" within the meaning of the NSPA.
139. See 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2602-03, 2607 (2003).
140. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2607 (2003).
141. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2602 (2003).
142. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2603 (2003).
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institution in any State Party. 1 43
However, the CPIA limits the extent to which the market can be
restricted through several conditions. These limitations strike a
balance between the U.S. economic policy of a free market and
Congress's recognition that the market for cultural property is
unique and certain trade restrictions may be necessary to achieve
the objectives of the Convention. The legislative history of the
CPIA illustrates this point.
But unlike other commodities, increased or new production
of these [archaeological and ethnological materials and
antiquities] cannot rise to meet the demand. Instead, the
increased supply results from the sales of known artifacts
and those newly recovered from archaeological sites. The
unique origin and character of these articles raises serious
trade issues distinct from the normal concerns of the
reciprocal trade agreements program or U.S. trade law.'"
The Senate further recognized that the United States is a
"principle market for articles of archaeological and ethnological
interest and of art objects[.]"' 45 Finally, the Senate explained in
full detail the several conditions that must be met before the
President may authorize restrictions on the import of another
nation's cultural property.
1. Definition of Material Subject to Import Restrictions
The first of such restrictions is embodied in the definition of the
materials that qualify for import restrictions. In recognizing that
the Convention does not define "archaeological" or "ethnological"
material, the Senate committee reported the following: "[t]he
definition is intended. .. to reflect the understanding of the U.S.
negotiators that the application of import restrictions under
143. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2607 (2003).
144. S. REP. No. 97-564, 22-23 (1982).
145. Id. at 23.
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agreements entered into... or emergency actions taken... is limited
to a narrow range of objects possessing certain characteristics."' 46
By limiting the scope of material that qualifies for protection, the
United States reinforced its economic policy of maintaining a free
and open market. Thus, Congress intended to allow only a very
specific category of material to be removed from that free market
through the imposition of import restrictions.
Archaeological material is defined as "any object which is of
cultural significance, which is at least 250 years old, and which
normally has been discovered through scientific exploration on
land or under water."'47  The Senate committee stated that "the
250-year threshold age requirement ensures that the controls
authorized by this Act will be applied to objects of significantly
rare archaeological stature, while encompassing a range of
important artifacts that are of a more recent vintage."' 48  The
committee also noted that archaeological sites that are important to
"understanding the settlement of North America contain objects
not greatly exceeding 250 years of age."'49 This finding indicates
that Congress set the 250-years old minimum at what it considered
the lowest threshold necessary for classifying archaeological
material. Thus, the age requirement was not arbitrarily set, but
rather was set with recognition given to the purpose of the
legislation to protect cultural treasures that are important to their
country of origin.'5 ° In contrast, the Archaeological Resources
Protection Act [hereinafter ARPA] sets the minimum age
requirement at 100 years for the protection of U.S. archaeological
material. 5' However, ARPA is codified in Chapter 16 of the U.S.
Code dealing with "conservation" as opposed to international trade
and its purpose is domestic protection of U.S. archaeological
146. Id. at 25.
147. Id. See also 19 U.S.C.A. § 2601(2) (2003).
148. S. REP. No. 97-564, 25 (1982).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 21.
151. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 470bb(l) (2003) (stating that "[n]o item shall be
treated as an archaeological resource under regulations under this paragraph
unless such item is at least 100 years of age").
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material. 5 2
Ethnological material is defined more broadly than
archaeological material. Ethnological material is "any object that
is the product of a tribal or similar society, and is important to the
cultural heritage of a people because of its distinctive
characteristics, its comparative rarity, or its contribution to the
knowledge of their origins, development or history."'53 Though
ethnological material is not limited by age requirements, Congress
did intend for its scope to be limited. "The committee intends this
definition, to encompass only what is sometimes termed
'primitive' or 'tribal' art, such as masks, idols, or totem poles,
produced by tribal societies in Africa and South America."' 54 The
Senate further explained that,
[t]he committee does not intend the definition of
ethnological material... to apply to trinkets and other objects
that are common or repetitive or essentially alike in material,
design, color, or other outstanding characteristics with other
objects of the same type, or which have relatively little value
for understanding the origins or history of a particular people
or society. An agreement or emergency action would also
not apply to ethnological material produced by more
technologically advanced societies.55
However, the definition allows the CPAC to have discretion in
its interpretation of the statute and has been construed broadly in
the past. Bilateral agreements such as those with Italy and Canada
152. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 470aa(b) (2003) (stating that the purpose of ARPA is
to "secure, for the present benefit of the American people, the protection of
archaeological resources and sites which are on public lands and Indian lands,
and to foster increased cooperation and exchange of information between
governmental authorities, the professional archaeological community, and
private individuals having collections of archaeological resources and data").
153. S. REP. No. 97-564, 25 (1982). See also 19 U.S.C.A. § 2601(2) (2003).
154. S. REP. No. 97-564, 25 (1982).
155. Id.
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are illustrations of such broad interpretation. 56
The requirements inherent in the definitions of archaeological
and ethnological material create guidelines for the President and
the Cultural Property Advisory Committee'57 [hereinafter CPAC]
to follow in its assessment of whether material qualifies for CPIA
protection. It is, thus, clear that Congress interpreted and defined
the key terms of the Convention so as to manifest its intention of
limiting the scope of material for which other State Parties could
request import restrictions.
2. UNESCO Convention State Party Requirement
Currently, the United States may impose import bans on the
cultural property of other State Parties to the Convention.'58 This
156. See Federal Register Notice: January 23, 2001; 66(15): 7399-7402,
Import Restrictions Imposed On Archaeological Material Originating in Italy
and Representing the Pre-Classical, Classical, and Imperial Roman Periods,
available at http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/it0l frO l.html, and see Federal
Register Notice, April 22, 1997; 62(77):19488-19492 (Expired) Archaeological
and Ethnological Material From Canada, available at
http://exchanges.state.gov/culprop/ca97frO l.html.
157. The Cultural Property Advisory Committee is composed of eleven
Presidentially-appointed members. Two represent the museum community,
three are experts in either archaeology, anthropology, or ethnology, three are
experts in the international sale of cultural property representing the interest of
collectors and dealers, and the remaining three are representatives from the
general public. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2605 (2003). The Senate reported that the
"exercise by the President of the authorities provided in [the CPIA] will require
substantial input from knowledgeable representatives of the private sector.
Section 206 [U.S.C.A. § 2605] establishes a Cultural Property Advisory
Committee for this purpose." S. REP. No. 97-564 at 30.
158. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2601(5) (2003), defining "Convention" as "the
Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export,
and transfer of ownership of cultural property adopted by the General
Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization at its sixteenth session." And defining "State Party" as "any
nation which has ratified, accepted or acceded to the Convention." Id. at
2601(9). See also, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2602(a)(2) and 2603(b) (2003), outlining the
President's authority to enter agreements and to take emergency action.
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requirement applies to bilateral agreements, to emergency actions,
and to § 2607 blanket import bans on stolen cultural property.
Additionally, the CPIA requires the foreign State to include, in its
formal request for import restrictions, evidence of its domestic
efforts to protect its own cultural property. 59 These requirements
are consistent with the UNESCO Convention's emphasis on
requiring a State to first protect its own cultural property at the
domestic level before requesting assistance from the international
community.16  By joining the UNESCO Convention, States
assume a duty to take affirmative steps at the national level to
protect their own cultural property.' 61 States that have failed to
join the UNESCO Convention are under no such obligation. By
only allowing the United States to enter trade agreements with
other State Parties and by requiring a showing that the "State Party
has taken measures consistent with the Convention to protect its
cultural patrimony," Congress has remained consistent with the
UNESCO Convention's policy supporting international concerted
action as a supplement to domestic protection measures. 61
3. Duration Limitations
Specific statutory time limits create another limitation on the
CPIA's ability to restrict the free trade of cultural property.
Bilateral and multilateral agreements impose initial import
restrictions for 5 years. The agreement is then renewable for
159. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2602(a)(1)(B) (2003).
160. See 823 U.N.T.S. 231, pmbl., regarding the policy considerations of the
Convention. "... it is incumbent upon every State to protect the cultural
property existing within its territory against the dangers of theft, clandestine
excavation, and illicit export,... to avert these dangers, it is essential for every
State to become increasingly alive to the moral obligations to respect its own
cultural heritage and that of all nations, [and] ... the protection of cultural
heritage can be effective only if organized both nationally and internationally
among States working in close co-operation[.]" Id. (emphasis added).
161. See Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970,
823 U.N.T.S. 231, arts. 5, 6, and 7(a) (1972).
162. Quoting 19 U.S.C.A. § 2602(a)(1)(B) (2003).
20031
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additional 5-year periods upon a finding that the necessary
conditions still exist to warrant the renewal. Emergency import
restrictions are limited to a possible 8-year maximum. The time
limits for import restrictions are definite and put the requesting
country on notice at the outset of the import ban's expiration date.
These provisions create clear time guidelines during which the
State must strengthen its own intemnal protections. By eliminating
the requesting State's ability to rely on the U.S. import restrictions
indefinitely, the requesting State has a greater incentive to take
affirmative steps domestically to remedy risk of pillage. The time
limit creates an incentive for the requesting State to take
immediate remedial action while providing sufficient time for the
creation of a domestic protective infrastructure. The limitations
are consistent with the CPIA's objective of encouraging self-help.
4. Continuous CPAC Review
All agreements and emergency import restrictions are subject to
a CPAC review process.'63 Where cause exists, the CPAC may
recommend a suspension of an agreement."6 Additionally, if the
CPAC determines that any agreement or emergency action is not
achieving its objectives, the CPAC may make a recommendation
for "improving the effectiveness of any such agreement or
emergency action. . .""' This procedural safeguard acts as a check
on the necessity and effectiveness of import restrictions after the
President authorizes their imposition.
5. Conditional Requirements to Entering Bilateral Agreements
Several other limitations are embodied in the specific conditions
that the President, with the advice of the CPAC, must determine
are met prior to entering a bilateral agreement. The Senate stated
that such determinations "are intended to ensure that the requesting
163. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2605(g) (2003).
164. Id.
165. Id. § 2605(g)(2).
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nation is engaged in self-help measures and that U.S. cooperation,
in the context of a concerted international effort, will significantly
enhance the chances of their success in preventing the pillage."'66
The first condition requires a showing by the requesting State
that its cultural patrimony is in jeopardy from pillage of
archaeological or ethnological materials.'67 This requirement is
consistent with the general purpose of the Convention "to combat
the increasing illegal international trade in national art treasures,
which in some countries has led to wholesale pillaging."'68 The
United States will, therefore, only restrict its art market through
the imposition of import restrictions if the requesting State can
prove that its material is in "jeopardy of pillage." By imposing
such a requirement the United States is further limiting the
situations in which it deems trade restrictions necessary in order to
preserve free trade.
The second condition requires that the State Party show proof of
its own domestic protections for cultural property. The President
may enter agreements only after determining "that the State Party
has taken measures consistent with the Convention to protect its
cultural patrimony." '69  This requirement reflects the UNESCO
Convention's objective of providing international import
restrictions as a supplement to a State Party's domestic
protections.
Third, the CPIA requires that the requesting nation show that the
U.S. import restrictions, if applied, would be an effective means of
achieving the CPIA's objective of "deterring a serious situation of
pillage."'7 ° In addition, it must be determined that there are no less
166. S. REP. No. 97-564, 26 (1982).
167. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2602(a)(1)(A) (2003).
168. S. REP. No. 97-564, 24 (1982).
169. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2602(a)(1)(B) (2003).
170. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2602(a)(1)(C)(i) (2003), requiring a finding that "the
application of the import restrictions set forth in section 2606 of this title with
respect to archaeological or ethnological material of the State Party, if applied in
concert with similar restrictions implemented, or to be implemented within a
reasonable period of time, by those nations (whether or not State Parties)
individually having a significant import trade in such material, would be of
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restrictive means of achieving the objective. 7' Congress
specifically intended that determinations for the necessity to
impose import restrictions be made on an objective basis and from
the U.S. perspective. Congress also intended to further the
Convention policy of concerted international protection efforts
when it enacted these provisions. The Senate noted such
intentions when it reported that,
these limitations ... ensure that the United States will reach
an independent judgment regarding the need and scope of
import controls. That is, U.S. actions need not be
coextensive with the broadest declarations of ownership and
historical or scientific value made by other nations. U.S.
actions in these complex matters should not be bound by the
characterization of other countries... the concept that U.S.
import controls should be part of a concerted international
effort is embodied in Article 9 of the Convention and carried
forward in section [2602]. '72
When considering the likelihood of deterrence, it could be
inferred that the CPIA requires an international market analysis
regarding the trade of the material at issue. In enacting these
requirements, Congress gave consideration to the nature of the
antiquities and cultural property market as well as to its interest in
preventing the impositions of unreasonable restrictions on trade. 73
substantial benefit in deterring a serious situation of pillage[.]"
171. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2602(a)(l)(C)(ii) (2003), requiring a determination
that "remedies less drastic than the application of the restrictions set forth in
such section are not available[.]"
172. S. REP. No. 97-564, 26 (1982). See also, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2602 (2003).
173. See S. REP. No. 97-564, 27 (1982), explaining that "[t]he determination
of which countries have a significant import trade in the material that is in
jeopardy of being pillaged, and whether the effort will help to ameliorate the
problem, is within the discretion of the President. These decisions inherently
preclude precise determination, given the goals of the Convention and the
uncertain factual basis for them. Whether a country has a 'significant import
trade' may be a function of not only value imports, but type and historic trading
patterns. Therefore, a measure of Presidential judgment is required.
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Due to the lack of specific data regarding the international market
in the trade of antiquities, especially illicit antiquities, Congress
recognized that it would be impracticable to require a specific
market analysis.'74 First it must be determined whether one or more
nations have a significant import market for the material.'75 If so,
it must then be determined whether those countries have or plan to
impose, in a reasonable time, restrictions on that trade. 76 If a
nation that does have a significant import market for the material is
found to have import restrictions, (or plans to implement similar
restrictions), then it must be determined whether those restrictions,
in concert with the U.S. restrictions, would be a substantial benefit
in deterring pillage. 77  To make such a determination, the
combined demand for the material in both the United States and
the other nation(s) should be viewed in context of the global
demand for such material. This could require an economic
analysis to determine a minimum percent that the global demand
for such material would have to be reduced to deter pillage.
However, absent reliable, factual information regarding the market
for such material, a general estimation may be made considering
the known market facts and historical patterns of trade. Once a
baseline percent is adduced, the question is simply, whether the
combined total percent of demand in the United States and other
market nation(s) is equal to or greater than the baseline percent. If
it is, then this condition is satisfied. On the other hand, when it
cannot be shown that the other market nation(s) currently has, or
plans to impose in the near future, any market restrictions on the
Nevertheless, the committee believes the standards set forth in this
section.. will ensure that the President will enter into agreements only in
accord with the purposes and standards of the Bill."
174. See id., stating that, "[i]t is the committee's further intent that the
formula measuring the presence and worth of a 'concerted international effort'
not be so mechanical as to preclude the conclusion of agreements under section
203(a) [codified at 19 U.S.C.A. § 2602(a)] where the purposes of the legislation
nevertheless would be served by doing so."
175. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2602(a)(1)(C)(i) (2003).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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material, then the condition is not met. In those cases, the United
States will not impose restrictions on the import of such material
because a constant demand for the material on the global market
would remain. Thus, U.S. restrictions, if imposed, would not be an
adequate means of reaching the objective of deterring pillaging.
However, Section 2602(c) of the CPIA provides an exception to
subpart (i) of the third condition. The exception applies when "a
nation individually having a significant import trade in such
material is not implementing, or is not likely to implement, similar
restrictions."'78 Under the exception, the President may impose
U.S. import restrictions on the material if trade restrictions in the
other market country "are not essential to deter a serious situation
of pillage."'79  U.S. import restrictions, when considered in
combination with similar restrictions implemented by nations that
also have a significant import trade in such material, "would be of
substantial benefit in deterring a serious situation of pillage."'80
Thus, if it can be shown that there is only one nation with a
significant import trade in the material at issue that is not
implementing similar import restrictions, then the exception may
apply.
The next step would be to consider whether pillage deterrence
can only be achieved if that nation imposes trade restrictions on
the material. In order to make such a determination, the President
should consider that country's market share in the world-wide
market for the import trade of such material. If that country's
individual market share is dominant, or so large that global
demand will not be reduced absent that country's participation in
concerted trade restrictions, then the circumstances will not satisfy
the "essential" prong of the exception. If however, the country's
individual market share is not dominant, then import restrictions in
that country may not be "essential to deter a serious situation of
pillage.""' 8
178. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2602(c)(2) (2003).
179. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2602(c)(2)(A) (2003).
180. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2602(c)(2)(B) (2003).
181. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2602(c)(2)(A) (2003).
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When the first prong is satisfied, the third step is for the
President to consider whether U.S. imposed restrictions, when
considered in combination with current import restrictions or those
soon to be implemented in other countries that also have a
significant import trade, would substantially benefit the deterrence
of pillage. It appears that this prong is satisfied when the sum of
market shares for the United States and all significant market
countries that have or plan to have import restrictions equals a
dominant percent of the total market. Where both prongs of the
exception are satisfied, then U.S. import restrictions may be
imposed regardless of one market nation not participating through
the implementation of import restrictions.
The second subpart of the third condition requires a
determination that there are no less restrictive means of achieving
the same objective. Under § 2602(a)(1)(C)(ii) of the CPIA, the
President must make a finding that "remedies less drastic than the
application of the restrictions set forth in such section are not
available."'82 Thus, if the President determines that measures less
drastic than a restriction on the importation of certain
archaeological or ethnological material are available to prevent
pillage of the material at issue, then the President shall not enter a
bilateral agreement. This condition creates a requirement that the
import restrictions be a narrowly tailored solution to achieve the
government's objective. Requests for import restrictions that
sweep too broadly, that restrict more trade than necessary to
reduce the incentive to pillage, will be denied.
The fourth condition requires the President to determine that the
import restrictions under the circumstances of each case would be
"consistent with the general interest of the international
community in the interchange of cultural property among nations
for scientific, cultural, and educational purposes." ' 3
182. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2602(a)(1)(C)(ii) (2003).
183. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2602(a)(1)(D) (2003).
2003] 423
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6. Restrictions on Emergency Actions
Additional limitations exist under the CPIA's grant of authority
to impose import restrictions on cultural property dealing with
emergency situations. Before the President may impose unilateral
import restrictions on a State's cultural property, the State must
have made a formal request to enter a bilateral agreement with the
United States, the President must determine that an "emergency
condition"'84  exists, and the President must consider the
recommendations of the CPAC.'85 The imposition of emergency
import restrictions is further limited by duration of applicability.
Section 2603(c)(3) of the CPIA states that, "No import
restrictions... may be applied under this section... for more than
five years after the date on which the request of a State Party... is
made to the United States."' 86 The emergency import restrictions
may be extended for three additional years if the "emergency
condition" continues to exist. Before the President may authorize
184. Section 2603 of the CPIA covers the emergency implementation of
import restrictions. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2603 (2003). This section outlines three
situations that qualify as an "emergency condition." Id. An emergency
condition exists when the state's cultural material is:
(1) a newly discovered type of material which is of importance for the
understanding of the history of mankind and is in jeopardy from pillage,
dismantling, dispersal, or fragmentation;
(2) identifiable as coming from any site recognized to be of high cultural
significance is such site is in jeopardy from pillage, dismantling,
dispersal, or fragmentation which is, or threatens to be, of crisis
proportions; or
(3) a part of the remains of a particular culture or civilization, the record
of which is in jeopardy from pillage, dismantling, dispersal, or
fragmentation which is, or threatens to be, of crisis proportions. Id. §
2603(a).
185. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2603 (2003). See also S. REP. NO. 97-564 at 28-9
(explaining the limitations of the President's authority to implement emergency
restrictions.) "First, it prohibits the President from implementing section 204
[U.S.C.A. § 2603] unless the State Party made a request to the United
States... Second, before making his decision on emergency action, the President
must consider the views and recommendations of the Advisory Committee." Id.
186. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2603(c)(3) (2003).
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such an extension, the President is required to request and consider
the recommendations of the CPAC.'87
This Section of the CPIA does not require that the President
determine that import restrictions are the least restrictive means
before implementing emergency import restrictions. However,
Congress ensured that the emergency implementation of import
restrictions would not unreasonably restrain trade by specifically
limiting the duration of the import ban. Under the current CPIA,
emergency import restrictions may only be in place for a
maximum of eight years, as opposed to the possible indefinite
renewal process available for bilateral agreements.
7. The Limited Scope of Blanket Import Bans on Stolen Cultural
Property
Another limitation of the CPIA's authority to restrict the free
trade of cultural property involves the provision covering stolen
cultural property. Section 2607 of the CPIA implements Article
7(B)(1) of the UNESCO Convention by creating a blanket
protection for "cultural property stolen from the inventory of a
museum or religious or secular monument or similar institution."'88
This Section creates a general ban on the importation of stolen
cultural property. However, the Section only applies if the object
was stolen from a "museum or religious or secular public
monument or similar institution in any State Party."'8 9  The
Section also requires that the object be "documented as
appertaining to the inventory" of such institutions.' 90  The
documentation requirement ensures that only objects stolen from
the institutions of other State Parties to the UNESCO Convention
will receive U.S. protection. An object's proof of documentation
as belonging to another institution also serves as proof that the
object is "stolen." Furthermore, objects stolen from private
187. Id.
188. S. REP. No. 97-564 at 31. See also 19 U.S.C.A. 2607 (2003).
189. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2607 (2003) (emphasis added).
190. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2607(2003).
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individuals are not covered by this Section.
IV. INADEQUACIES OF CURRENT PROTECTIONS
Congress recognized that neither the CPIA nor the OFAC
sanctions could provide sufficient protection for Iraq's antiquities.
The following is an explanation of the legal loopholes that the
proposed bills seek to close. Iraq is a State Party to the UNESCO
Convention, however, because it lacks a formal government it
would not be able to meet the first requirement under the CPIA,
that the government of the State Party must make a formal request
for the imposition of import restrictions. It is also debatable
whether Iraq, absent a formal government, legally remains a State
Party to the Convention. Furthermore, Iraq will not be able to
satisfy the CPIA requirement that it "has taken measures consistent
with the Convention to protect its cultural patrimony." Though
Iraq had very protective antiquities laws prior to the fall of the
Saddam Regime and effective enforcement at least until 1991, it is
not certain that, under the new government, those laws will be
reenacted and enforced. If the new Iraqi government chooses to
write new antiquities laws, they would have to provide sufficient
safeguards for the national protection of Iraq's own cultural
property. Once enacted, such laws would have to be strictly
enforced. However, Iraq does not yet have the resources to
provide the infrastructure necessary for effective and strict
enforcement of its antiquities laws.
If Iraq is still considered a State Party to the Convention, then it
will qualify for the blanket protections provided under § 2607 of
the CPIA covering documented and inventoried stolen cultural
property belonging to a religious or public institution.'9' Those
objects of cultural property looted from the museums, libraries,
schools, and other public institutions cannot be legally imported
191. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2607 (2003). "No article of cultural property
documented as appertaining to the inventory of a museum or religious or secular
public monument or similar institution in any State Party which is stolen from
such institution. . .may be imported into the United States." Id.
426
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into the United States if the object is documented as belonging to
the inventory of such an institution. Therefore, a significant
amount of the items stolen from the National Museum in Baghdad
would be subject to this import restriction. However, those objects
in the study collection of the Museum that remain undocumented
or are not inventoried do not qualify for protection. Similarly, all
objects looted from archaeological sites are, by their very nature of
not having been previously discovered, undocumented and do not
qualify for protection under this Section of the CPIA.
The indefiniteness of the OFAC sanctions render them
insufficient. The economic sanctions currently barring the import
of Iraqi cultural property are subject to an executive order. If the
President determines that the situation is such that the sanctions
are no longer warranted, then the sanctions may be lifted at any
time.
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Representatives Phil English and Jim Leach responded
immediately to the looting and pillage in Iraq by proposing H.R.
2009. In response to the broad protections endorsed in the House
bill, Senators Charles Grassley and Max Baucus introduced S.
1291 as a more narrowly tailored means of protecting Iraq's
cultural property. Several members from the U.S. cultural
property community responded to the proposed legislation with
mixed support and concern. In November 2003, after taking into
consideration the criticisms and concerns regarding H.R. 2009,
Representatives English and Leach introduced a new bill in the
House of Representatives that effectively replaces H.R. 2009.
A. HR 2009: Iraq Cultural Heritage Protection Act (I)
On May 7, 2003, Representative Phil English from Pennsylvania
and Representative Jim Leach from Iowa introduced the Iraq
Cultural Heritage Protection Act in the House of
2003]
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Representatives.'92 The purpose of the bill is "[t]o provide for the
recovery, restitution, and protection of the cultural heritage of
Iraq."' 9 3 As a means of achieving this purpose, the bill proposes a
blanket import restriction on all "archaeological" and "cultural"
material of Iraq that was removed from Iraq after August 2,
1990.194 The import restrictions are to run indefinitely, subject
only to a future legislative act.' 95 The import prohibition shall be
enforced at the point of entry by customs officials through seizure
and forfeiture.'96 The Act provides for repatriation of material
forfeited in violation of the Act.'97
The definitions of the material subject to protection differ from
those under the CPIA. The Act defines "archaeological material of
Iraq" as:
any object or fragment or part of an object... that was first
found within the borders of Iraq. . ., and that was built,
manufactured, sculpted, produced, or written by humans; is
at least 100 years old; and was discovered as a result of
scientific excavation, illegal or clandestine digging,
accidental discovery, or exploration on land or under
192. See H.R. 2009, 108th Cong. (2003). The bill currently has sixty-five
representatives as co-sponsors.
193. H.R. 2009, 108th Cong. (2003).
194. Id. § 3(a). Those materials may only be lawfully imported into the
United States if the "Government of Iraq issues a certification or other
documentation certifying that the exportation of the material from Iraq was not
in violation of the laws of Iraq." Id.
195. See id. § 3 (by failing to expressly state an expiration date or time limit
on the import restrictions proposed in this bill, it can be inferred that the
restrictions will run indefinitely unless the Act were repealed or amended in a
future congressional session.)
196. Id. § 3(b). See also id. § 4 (material "that is imported into the United
States in violation of this Act shall be seized and subject to seizure, forfeiture
under the customs laws of the United States. All provision of law relating to
seizure, forfeiture, and condemnation for violation of the customs laws shall
apply...").
197. Id. § 4(b). "[M]aterial of Iraq that is forfeited to the United States under
this Act shall be returned to the country of Iraq." Id.
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water. 198
This definition differs from the definition of objects of
archaeological interest under the CPIA, in that it reduces the
minimum age requirement from 250 years to 100 years. It also
requires that the material be produced by humans, whereas the
CPIA merely states that the object must be of cultural
significance.'99 The bill defines "cultural material of Iraq" as:
any object, regardless of age, including manuscripts, and
materials used for traditional or religious ceremonial
purposes, or a fragment or part of an object, that was, on or
after August 2, 1990, in the care of Iraq's cultural or
religious institutions and is of historic, artistic, religious,
scientific, or cultural interest. °0
Under the CPIA, the second category of protected objects are
those of "ethnological interest" which are the product of a non-
industrial society and important to the cultural heritage of the
people.20 ' The definition of "cultural material of Iraq" under H.R.
2009 covers a broader scope of material than what would qualify
as ethnological material under the CPIA because it does not
require that the objects be the product of a non-industrial society.
Section five of H.R. 2009 specifically defines the "country of
origin." This change eliminates the problem of determining how
to define an object's "country of origin" when applying customs
laws.20 2 Under H.R. 2009, the country of origin is "the country
within whose borders, as they exist at the time the object or
fragment is imported... into the United States, the object or
198. Id. § 2(1). The bill also includes human and animal skeletal remains
and plant remains under the definition of archaeological material if it is found in
association with other archaeological material. Id.
199. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2601(2)(C)(i) (2003).
200. H.R. 2009, 108th Cong. § 2(2) (2003).
201. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2601(2)(C)(ii) (2003).
202. H.R. 2009, 108th Cong. § 5 (2003).
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fragment was first discovered or excavated. 20 3  Thus, any
archaeological material's country of origin is the country in which
it was first discovered or removed from the ground regardless of
whether the material has been held in a private collection in
another country for any length of time.
H.R. 2009 also proposes six significant amendments to the
CPIA that are unrelated to the import restrictions to be imposed on
archaeological and cultural material of Iraq under §§ 2-5 of the
bill.2 °4 First, the bill would change the definition of objects of
archaeological interest under the CPIA to cover objects that meet a
minimum 100 year age requirement as opposed to the current 250
205year minimum.
The second amendment to the CPIA eliminates the requirement
that the country receiving benefit of emergency import restrictions
be a State Party to the UNESCO Convention. 26 This amendment
only applies to import restrictions imposed pursuant to section
2603 of the CPIA. °7 It does not apply to bilateral agreements or to
blanket import restrictions on objects stolen from institutions.
Thus, UNESCO Convention State Party status is still required for
cultural property protection pursuant to Sections 2602 and 2607 of
the CPIA. °8
The third amendment eliminates the need for a country to make
a formal request in order to receive emergency import
restrictions.2 9 Under this bill, the President may on his own
initiative impose emergency import restrictions when he
determines that another country's situation warrants such
protection.
Fourth, CPIA § 2603(c)(3) is replaced with a paragraph that
omits the requirement that the President request and consider
recommendations of the CPAC before extending emergency
203. Id.
204. See H.R. 2009, 108th Cong. §§ 2-6 (2003).
205. See id. § 6(a).
206. See id. § 6(b), (c).
207. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2603 (2003).
208. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2602, 2607 (2003).
209. See H.R. 2009, 108th Cong. § 6(b)(2) (2003).
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import restrictions. 2'° This change is intended to expedite the
process of imposing emergency import restrictions in true
emergency situations. It allows the President, acting alone, to
react timely to emergency situations without having to wait for a
formal recommendation from the CPAC.
Fifth, H.R. 2009 extends the duration of import restrictions
imposed pursuant to unilateral emergency actions.2 ' The bill
increases the initial duration of emergency restrictions from five
years to ten.2 2 The amendment also changes the date on which the
period begins to run from the current "date on which the request of
a State Party... is made to the United States, ' '213 to "the date on
which the notice in the Federal Register imposing such restrictions
is published."' 2 4 Because this bill eliminates the formal request
requirement for emergency actions, the date for running also
needed to be changed. This change extends, defacto, the length of
protection.
The bill also states that "[s]uch 10-year period may be extended
by the President if the President determines that the emergency
condition continues to apply. ' 21 5  This sentence is significant
because, though somewhat ambiguous, it appears to allow the
emergency restrictions to be extended for a second ten-year term.
Emergency import restrictions could potentially be in place for a
total of 20 years as opposed to the current limit of 8 years. One
could also interpret the sentence as failing to specify the length of
time for restriction extensions. Interpreted as such, it can be
inferred that the President is granted unlimited discretion in
determining the length of the extension.
The sixth amendment proposed in H.R. 2009 increases the
extension of bilateral agreements from an additional five years to
an additional ten. However, H.R. 2009 does not change the initial
five-year duration of import restrictions when they are imposed
210. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2603(c)(3) (2003).
211. H.R. 2009, 108th Cong. §§ 6(b), (d) (2003).
212. Id. § 6(b).
213. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2603(c)(3).
214. H.R. 2009, 108th Cong. § 6(b) (2003).
215. Id.
2003]
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pursuant to a bilateral agreement.
B. S. 1291: Emergency Protection for Iraqi Cultural Antiquities
Act of 2003
In response to H.R. 2009's broad protection of Iraq's antiquities
and the attached CPIA amendments, the U.S. Senate proposed a
bill specifically limited to remedying the Iraq situation. Senators
Charles Grassley, a Republican from Iowa, and Max Baucus, a
Democrat from Montana, proposed Senate bill 1291 on June 19,
2003, "[t]o authorize the President to impose restrictions on
archaeological or ethnological materials of Iraq until normalization
of relations between the United States and the Government of Iraq
has been established."2"6 Sen. Grassley explained that the bill was
meant to close the potential legal loophole in the protection of Iraq
antiquities. "If the Administration were to normalize relations
between the United States and the next Government of Iraq,
thereby terminating the OFAC import restrictions, it is possible
that looted Iraqi antiquities could begin entering the United States
while we sit and wait for a possible bilateral agreement to be
finalized."2 7
This bill simply authorizes the President to impose emergency
import restrictions pursuant to his authority under § 2603 of the
CPIA on all archaeological and ethnological material of Iraq
without Iraq making a formal request and without a
recommendation by the CPAC." 8 The bill allows the restrictions
to run until September 30, 2004, or 12 months after the President
certifies to Congress the normalization of relations between the US
and Iraq.2"9 Termination occurs at which time either deadline is
met.220 The bill also provides a specific definition of
archaeological and ethnological material that would be subject to
the emergency restrictions.
216. S. 1291, 108th Cong. (2003).
217. See S. 1291, 108th Cong. pmbl. (2003).
218. S. 1291, 108th Cong. § 2(a) (2003).
219. Id. § 3.
220. Id.
432
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[T]he term "archaeological or ethnological material of Iraq"
means cultural property of Iraq and other items of
archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, or
religious importance illegally removed from the Iraq
National Museum, the National Library of Iraq, and other
locations in Iraq, since the adoption of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 661 of 1990.221
Senators Grassley and Baucus intended that this legislation
would provide a "narrowly tailored amendment to the
Implementation Act." '  It does not "seek to supplant the
established process for protecting cultural antiquities under the
Implementation Act; instead, it permits an extra guarantee of
protection for Iraq's cultural antiquities in the short term while
Iraq completes its transition back into the community of
nations." '223 This bill also addresses the balance of interests that
Congress considered in its enactment of the CPIA. Grassley noted
that "[a]s we work to reestablish the free flow of trade with a
liberated Iraq, I believe it is very important that we in Congress
remain mindful of the need to take steps to protect Iraq's cultural
heritage."224
C. Public Support and Criticism of HR. 2009 and S. 1291
Several organizations throughout the cultural property
community expressed both approval of and concerns with the
provisions of H.R. 2009 and S. 1291. The cultural property
community is divided into three groups that traditionally have
competing interests: the dealers and collectors, the museums, and
the archaeologists. The dealers and collectors support H.R. 2009
to the extent that it deals with the Iraqi situation. However, they
221. Id. § 2(b). See also U.N. SCOR 1483, 7.
222. See S. 1291, 108th Cong. pmbl. (2003).
223. Id.
224. Id.
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oppose those portions of H.R. 2009 that significantly amend the
CPIA. The CPIA was enacted after thirteen years of careful
Congressional consideration and debate and the dealer community
believes it is inappropriate to hastily make significant changes to
it. "We think there is no need to hustle these provisions through
the Congress without open discussion and debate at hearings. ' '225
The museum community generally supports the passage of S.
1291 and opposes H.R. 2009, with the exception of certain
individual museums. The Association of Art Museum Directors
[hereinafter AAMD] expressed its support for S. 1291 in June
because the Senate bill would remedy the Iraqi situation without
changing the current process of protecting cultural property under
the CPIA . 2 6  The Senate bill would "most quickly solve[] this
pressing problem without unnecessary complications. "227 The
AAMD also stated that "[i]n a clear and concise bill, unburdened
by extraneous elements, S. 1291 reinforces the federal
government's determination not to allow looted artifacts to enter
the US. 22
8
The American Association of Museums [hereinafter AAM]
expressed its approval of the Senate's "recognition that there might
be a gap in legal authority to continue the current [OFAC
225. Letter from James Fitzpatrick, Attorney, Arnold and Porter, to Karin E.
Borke, Staff Writer, DePaul University Journal of Art and Entertainment Law
(October 2, 2003).
226. See Letter from Peter Morrin, President, Association of Art Museum
Directors, to Phil English and Jim Leach, Congressmen, U.S. House of
Representatives (June 24, 2003). And see Letter from Peter Morrin, President,
Association of Art Museum Directors, to Charles Grassley, Senator, U.S. Senate
(June 25, 2003).
227. Letter from Peter Morrin, President, Association of Art Museum
Directors, to Phil English and Jim Leach, Congressmen, U.S. House of
Representatives (June 24, 2003) (encouraging the congressmen to modify H.R.
2009 so that it is more in line with the bill proposed by Senator Grassley).
228. Letter from Peter Morrin, President, Association of Art Museum
Directors, to Charles Grassley, Senator, U.S. Senate (June 25, 2003) (expressing
approval of the Senate bill's approach because it does not eliminate the CPAC's
involvement in the determination of "emergency conditions" and it does not
extend the CPIA's protection to non-UNESCO countries).
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sanctions] once an interim government in Iraq is in place. 2 29 The
AAM further stated that "[a]llowing the President to impose
emergency import restrictions in an expedited and targeted manner
in this particular case, as S. 1291 proposes, is thus very appropriate
for the situation. '23' The AAM has concerns similar to the dealers
and collectors regarding the public policy of significantly changing
the CPIA "without substantial public hearings and testimony, since
it took 13 years of negotiation to arrive at the CPIA itself. 231
Other individual museums, such as The Field Museum, have
gone on record in support of H.R. 2009 because it provides longer
term protection than S. 1291.232 The Field Museum explained that
"[r]especting another country's export restrictions, as proposed in
H.R. 2009, is an important component of [the principles
formalized in the UNESCO Convention.] '233 The Field Museum
also supports the CPIA amendments proposed in H.R. 2009. 23' The
Field Museum reasoned that "[g]iving the President the ability to
enact emergency import restrictions without waiting for a [CPAC]
opinion is of critical importance if this country truly wants to act
quickly and in a meaningful manner in response to future incidents
229. Letter from Edward H. Able, Jr., President and CEO, American
Association of Museums, to Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, Senate Finance
Committee (July 7, 2003).
230. Id.
231. Id. See also Letter from Edward H. Able, Jr., President and CEO,
American Association of Museums, to Jim Leach and Phil English,
Congressmen, U.S. House of Representatives (July 29, 2003) (expressing that
"significant revisions of the Act should not be undertaken without hearings and
in the current pressing circumstances that require a quick solution").
232. See Letter from John W. McCarter, Jr., President and CEO, and Robert
D. Martin, Vice President, Academic Affairs and Provost, The Field Museum,
to Danny K. Davis, Congressman, U.S. House of Representatives (July 24,
2003).
233. Id. The Field Museum also noted that it has "continued its
groundbreaking research and collecting activities" while refusing to "acquire...
any object that cannot be shown to have been exported legally from its country
of origin." Id. Such research and collecting is "proof that this type of
legislation does not hinder scientific inquiry, nor will it lead to the end of
collecting." Id.
234. Id.
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around the world.... 235
Individuals and organizations from the scientific and academic
community fully support H.R. 2009 because it offers greater
protection for antiquities by enlarging the scope of objects that
qualify for protection and by extending the duration of import
restrictions. The Archaeological Institute of America [hereinafter
AIA] endorses H.R. 2009 and not S. 1291 because the House bill
provides indefinite as opposed to limited protection for Iraq's
antiquities. 2 6 The AIA believes that the Senate bill "offers no
disincentive to looting" because of its limited duration of
applicability. 237 John M. Russell, a professor of art history and
archaeology at the Massachusetts College of Art, encouraged the
archaeological community to support H.R. 2009, as opposed to S.
1291 because it would permanently prohibit the import of Iraqi
antiquities and "close a loophole in the current US law. 238
D. H.R. 3497: Iraq Cultural Heritage Protection Act (I)
Congressmen English and Leach introduced H.R. 3497 into the
House of Representatives on November 17, 2003. H.R. 3497
replaces H.R. 2009 and addresses several inconsistencies in H.R.
2009. H.R. 3497 proposes essentially the same ban on the import
of Iraqi archaeological and cultural material as was proposed in
H.R. 2009.239 The bill prohibits the importation of archaeological
material and cultural material of Iraq into the U.S. if removed from
Iraq after executive order 12722 of August 2, 1990 was issued.240
235. Id.
236. See The AIA's Position on Proposed Legislation Relating to the Import
Restrictions on Iraqi Archaeological and Cultural Materials available at
http://www.archaeological.org/webinfo.php?page = 10217.
237. See id.
238. Russell, supra note 70, at 14.
239. See generally H.R. 3497, 108th Cong. §§ 3 and 4 (2003). However, the
definition of "archaeological material of Iraq" now excludes coin and coin-like
objects less than 250 years old and provides a specific definition for coins and
coin-like objects. See H.R. 3497, 108th Cong. § 3(1) and (2) (2003).
240. H.R. 3497, 108th Cong. § 4(a) (2003).
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Archaeological material must be at least 100 years old.24' Cultural
material includes all objects, regardless of age, in the care of Iraq's
cultural or religious institutions that are of historic, artistic,
religious, scientific, or cultural interest. 4 2
Rather than running indefinitely, the import restrictions on Iraqi
archaeological and cultural material will cease "at the end of the 6-
month period beginning on the date on which paragraph 7 of
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483... ceases to be
effective or is suspended pursuant to a decision of the United
Nations Security Council. 24 3
H.R. 3497 contains CPIA amendments similar to those proposed
in H.R. 2009. First, the amendments change the minimum age
requirement within the definition of archaeological material from
250 to 100 years. Second, the amendments eliminate the
UNESCO Convention State Party requirement for countries
seeking import restrictions under § 2603 of the CPIA for
emergency conditions.245  Third, H.R. 3497 authorizes the
President to impose and renew emergency import restrictions
without a formal request from the country and without requesting a
review and recommendation from the CPAC.246 Fourth, H.R. 3497
241. See H.R. 3497, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003).
242. Id.
243. H.R. 3497, 108th Cong. § 4(c) (2003).
244. H.R. 3497, 108th Cong. § 7(a) (2003). This amendment also excludes
coin and coin-like objects less than 250 years old from the definition of
"archaeological material." Id.
245. Id. § 7(b) (striking "State Party" and replacing it with "country"). See
also id. § 7(d) (conforming amendments).
246. Id. § 7(b)(2) & (c)(3). This new bill also changes the composition of the
CPAC to add an additional position for a member from the museum community
and a position for "an expert in the field of conservation of archaeological or
ethnological artifacts, sites, or related areas." Id. at § 7(c)(1) & (2). It should
also be noted that although the requirement to consult the CPAC before entering
or renewing an emergency import restriction has been eliminated, that
requirement would still exist for entering bilateral agreements under § 2602 of
the CPIA. See 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2602(f) & 2605(f). The CPIA provision
allowing the CPAC to do a continuous review of the effectiveness of all import
restrictions, whether entered for emergency conditions or under bilateral
agreements, will also still be available. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2605(g) (2003).
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extends the duration of import restrictions under both emergency
conditions and bilateral agreements from five years to ten, with
each being renewable for unlimited, subsequent ten year periods. 47
Congress intends, by amending the CPIA, to expedite the CPIA
process of imposing emergency import restrictions and to provide
a more targeted response for countries in emergency situations.
Eliminating the mandatory CPAC consultation and the formal
request requirement allows the President to evaluate the situation
and, when warranted, authorize emergency import restrictions
more quickly. This new bill also has the effect of extending the
duration and scope of protection for international cultural property
under U.S. law. The definitional change of archaeological
material from a minimum 250 years to 100 years means that more
artifacts will fall within the scope of material that qualifies for
protection. The provision making emergency import restrictions
available for non-UNESCO State Parties has the effect of further
broadening the scope of material that qualifies for protection.
Finally, by extending the duration of import bans, the bill
significantly expands the length of time for which protection is
available.
VI. ANALYSIS
The "least restrictive means" is the appropriate approach for
protecting Iraq's antiquities and amending the CPIA. Using the
"least restrictive means" analysis, I will explain why neither S.
1291, nor H.R. 2009 should be passed in its current proposed form.
I will then argue that H.R. 3497's protection of Iraq's antiquities is
247. H.R. 3497, 108th Cong. § 7(b)(2)(B) (2003) ("No import
restrictions.. .may be applied under this section .... for more than 10 years after
the date on which the notice in the Federal Register imposing such restrictions is
published. Such 10-year period maybe extended by the President if the
President determines that the emergency condition continues to apply..."). And
see id. § 7(e) (changing agreement durations from five years to ten, renewable
for 10-year periods and allowing existing agreements to run for "ten years
beginning on the date on which the agreement entered into force with respect to
the United States").
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properly tailored to meet its objectives, but that the CPIA should
not be amended unless such amendments can be proven necessary.
A. Reason for Applying Strict Scrutiny
In maintaining consistency with the aims of the CPIA and the
UNESCO Convention, any legislation seeking to restrict the free
trade of cultural property through the imposition of U.S. import
restrictions should be narrowly tailored to achieve its objectives.
By requiring that import restrictions be necessary to achieve the
protection of international cultural property and be the least
restrictive means of aiding international cultural property
protection, free trade will not be unreasonably restrained.
The United States aided in drafting the UNESCO Convention so
that it requires each State Party to actively protect its own cultural
property through strictly enforced domestic measures before
seeking international support. This requirement was a concession
on the part of the United States to accept certain import restrictions
after rejecting the previously proposed total import ban on all
objects illegally exported from a State Party. Furthermore,
Congress enacted the CPIA specifically to implement into U.S.
law only Articles 7(b) and 9 of the UNESCO Convention. The
enactment of the CPIA represented Congress's restricted adoption
of the policies outlined in the UNESCO Convention. By
accepting, as a market country, the burden of participating in the
protection of cultural property under the UNESCO Convention,
Congress intentionally constructed the CPIA to include several
conditions and procedural safeguards as a means of limiting the
executive authority to impose import restrictions thereby
restraining trade. Congress achieved the appropriate balance
between encouraging free trade and participating in the
cooperative protection of international cultural property through its
enactment of the CPIA.
Where the interest in protecting another country's cultural
property is substantial enough to warrant a restriction on free trade,
the restriction must be narrowly tailored so that only those objects
that are intended to be protected receive the benefit of the import
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restriction. A restriction that sweeps too broadly, by protecting
more objects than necessary or that lasts for unreasonable lengths
of time cannot be justified under U.S. economic policy. The trade
agreement prerequisites and procedural safeguards that are
currently a part of the CPIA ensure that restraints on trade imposed
pursuant to the CPIA are reasonable and narrowly tailored to serve
the intended purpose of the CPIA and the UNESCO Convention.
Thus, any changes to the current system must be proven necessary
and the least restrictive means of achieving the objectives of the
UNESCO Convention.
B. Applying Strict Scrutiny to the Proposed Legislation
In part 1, I will explain how the Senate bill fails the strict
scrutiny standard because it is too narrowly tailored. S. 1291
provides inadequate protections and will not achieve its desired
objective. In part 2, I will explain how H.R. 2009, conversely,
sweeps too broadly and would have the effect of unreasonably
restraining trade. In part 3, I will argue that H.R. 3497 provides
the appropriate protection for Iraq's cultural property given the
emergency situation that exists in Iraq. In part 4, I will explain
why it would be inappropriate to significantly amend the CPIA
without proper Congressional hearings to assess whether such
amendments are necessary to achieve the UNESCO objectives.
1. Analysis of S. 1291
Several factors exist to justify the enactment of protective
legislation. Iraq has already suffered a great loss caused by looters
and pillage. The pillage of archaeological sites will continue to
occur so long as Iraq lacks an effective infrastructure of laws and
law enforcers to provide protection. The United States faces
international criticism for its failure to adequately protect Iraq's
antiquities. The protective legislation responds to the international
community's call for effective protection of Iraq's remaining
cultural property. S. 1291 purports to be a narrowly tailored
solution to the Iraqi situation by closing an alleged legal loophole.
440
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However, I find that S. 1291 is insufficient to achieve the desired
objectives.
The one-year limit of protection provided under S. 1291 is not
an adequate assessment of the amount of time necessary for Iraq to
enter a bilateral trade agreement under the current CPIA. First, it
is not clear that within one year's time Iraq will have a formal
constitutional government in place to make the formal request.
Until such government exists, Iraq cannot begin the application
process provided for under the CPIA. Second, even if a formal
government is in place within one year in Iraq, there is no
guarantee that the Iraq Antiquities Authority will have the
resources necessary to complete a formal application in a timely
manner.
Third, it is also not clear that Iraq would be able to meet the
CPIA requirements for emergency protection. The CPIA requires
that the requesting country take effective measures to protect its
own property. It is not clear whether the former Republic of Iraq
antiquities law will be reenacted or whether a new law will be
written. Furthermore, even if the former law is reenacted, the law
standing alone would not necessarily meet the CPIA requirement
absent a showing of its implementation through active
enforcement. Such adequate national enforcement does not appear
to be a high priority of the Iraqi people, nor even necessarily
possible. Currently the protection and safety of the Iraqi people,
and of other national resources, such as oil, is of graver concern. It
is unrealistic to think that the amount of officers necessary to
patrol the porous borders of Iraq and the thousands of
archaeological sites will be trained and in place within one-year's
time.
Finally, even if the Iraqi government made a formal request to
enter a trade agreement with the United States, there is no
guarantee that such an agreement would be entered. The CPAC
may not find that the conditions are satisfied for either a
memorandum of understanding or for a unilateral emergency
action. The final decision maker for all CPIA trade agreements is
the President, or an officer appointed by him. Even if the CPAC
gave an affirmative recommendation, the President has the
2003]
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authority to refuse to enter the trade agreement. Considering the
timetable for entering trade agreements as outlined by the current
CPIA S. 1291 is an unrealistic approach to providing effective
protection for Iraq's antiquities.
2. Analysis of H.R. 2009 's Protection of Iraqi Antiquities
H.R. 2009 fails to reach the balance of interests intended by
Congress in its enactment of the CPIA. H.R. 2009 affords more
protection for Iraq's antiquities than the Senate bill, but its
protection sweeps too broadly and, therefore, constitutes an
unreasonable restraint on trade. Because I do not agree with the
protections for Iraq's antiquities as proposed under this bill, I will
not address the CPIA amendments until my discussion of H.R.
3497.
Though H.R. 2009 and the CPIA seek to regulate and restrict the
international illicit trade of antiquities by eliminating a sector of
demand on the world art market, H.R. 2009 and the agreements
entered pursuant to the CPIA impose restrictions on the import of
goods into the United States, thus, the effects on the U.S. market
cannot be ignored. It is, therefore, important to balance two
competing themes of public policy: U.S. economic policy and U.S.
foreign policy. Legislation involving both realms of public policy
should strike a balance between encouraging free trade and
protecting international cultural property.
To remain consistent with traditional U.S. trade principles and
policies, any trade regulation should have the effect of
encouraging free trade. Under U.S. law, reasonable restraints on
trade are generally permissible. In considering the affect of time
limitations on reasonableness, the question is whether the length of
the restraint is fair under all the circumstances. In this case, H.R.
2009 imposes an unlimited restraint on the trade of all
archaeological and cultural material of Iraq. Import restrictions
that could potentially run indefinitely are not reasonable in these
circumstances. The import restrictions should have a limited
duration to encourage the people of Iraq to take domestic measures
to protect the country's own cultural property. Without a time
62
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol13/iss2/5
SEARCHING FOR A SOL UTION
limit on the U.S. import restrictions Iraq does not have an
incentive to promptly implement and enforce domestic protective
measures. Import restrictions with a definite time limit would
restrict trade less than indefinite restrictions and would still
achieve the aim of protecting Iraq's cultural property in this
emergency situation. Therefore, H.R. 2009 does not propose the
least restrictive means of achieving its objective.
3. Analysis of Protection of the Iraq's Antiquities under H.R.
3497
Under H.R. 3497, archaeological and cultural material of Iraq
removed from Iraq after August 2, 1990, which lacks proper
export documentation, shall not be imported into the United
States.248 The import restrictions imposed on Iraqi material will be
lifted "at the end of the 6-month period beginning on the date on
which paragraph 7 of the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1483... ceases to be effective or is suspended.
249
Considering the extensive looting of several archaeological sites
throughout Iraq resulting from the United States' war on Iraq, it is
clear that an emergency situation exists in Iraq and that the United
States has an obligation to take remedial measures in this situation.
To the extent that import restrictions may deter some trade of Iraqi
antiquities and may aid in the recovery of those items stolen from
the National Museum, the import restrictions are a necessary
means of achieving the objective of the Iraqi Cultural Heritage
Protection Act. As a matter of U.S. foreign policy it is important
for the U.S. to actively participate in the protection and recovery of
looted Iraqi antiquities. By specifically limiting the duration of the
import restrictions imposed on Iraq's antiquities, this bill strikes a
fair balance between restricting free trade and the important
foreign policy interest in actively protecting Iraqi cultural property.
248. See H.R. 3497, 108th Cong. § 4(a) (2003).
249. H.R. 3497, 108th Cong. § 4(c) (2003).
2003]
63
Borke: Searching for a Solution: An Analysis of the Legislative Response
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ.ART. &ENT.LAW [Vol. XIII:381
4. Analysis of the CPIA Amendments Proposed in H.R. 3497
At issue is whether the CPIA amendments proposed in H.R.
3497 are necessary to achieve the objectives of the CPIA or
whether they have the effect of allowing unreasonable restraints on
free trade. It should be noted that the CPIA amendments are
independent of the protection of Iraq's antiquities under this bill.
The amendments must be viewed in the context of their possible
effects on future emergency actions and bilateral agreements and
not in the context of the Iraqi situation.
a. Removal of State Party Requirement for Imposing
Emergency Import Restrictions
Congress specifically stipulated that only UNESCO State parties
would be eligible for U.S. import restrictions under the CPIA
recognizing the policy of concerted international protection as a
supplement to domestic protection for cultural property. The aim
of the UNESCO Convention itself is to provide international
cultural property protection as a supplement to domestic
protections. In order to achieve this goal, the UNESCO
Convention imposes an affirmative duty on each State Party to
protect its own cultural property at the domestic level before
requesting assistance from other State Parties. An amendment to
the CPIA allowing any country, not just UNESCO State Parties, to
receive emergency import restrictions for its cultural property
ignores this key objective of the UNESCO Convention.
International agreements and emergency import restrictions are
meant to encourage, and on some levels, facilitate national
protection in order to prevent pillage. By eliminating the State
Party requirement this amendment eliminates the guarantee that
the country receiving the benefit of the import restrictions is also
taking domestic actions to protect its own cultural property. If the
country experiencing an emergency situation of pillage has no
affirmative duty to try to remedy the situation domestically, then it
is not likely that U.S. import restrictions will help reduce the
pillage.
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The theory behind the CPIA is that U.S. import restrictions will
aid in reducing the demand for the looted antiquities by
eliminating a market country's demand. The import restrictions
realistically only lessen demand on the legitimate U.S. market.
The theory fails to consider the existence of a black market for
antiquities as well as the continued demand in other market
countries. With the existence of demand in other market countries
as well as on the black market, the objective of reducing pillage
cannot be met without a requirement that the country of origin take
affirmative domestic measures to protect its own cultural property.
Where the country of origin fails to take affirmative steps to
prevent the pillage and traffic of such objects, the objects can leave
the country easily and enter the world-wide market where demand
continues to exist. Reliance on unilateral U.S. import restrictions
alone is not an effective means of preventing pillage. Only those
countries that are party to the UNESCO Convention should receive
the reciprocal benefit of U.S.-imposed import restrictions because
those countries have accepted the affirmative obligation of
domestically protecting their own cultural property. Adhering to
this requirement addresses two key policy issues: that international
import restrictions are intended to supplement domestic protection
and that import restrictions should only be imposed where they are
a necessary means of reducing the incentive to pillage.
b. Elimination of Formal Request Requirement and
CPAC Recommendation for Emergency Actions
Emergency situations require a timely response, however, the
CPIA requirement for formal requests and a CPAC
recommendation are administerial inefficiencies that hinder the
CPIA's effectiveness. The Iraq situation, which would clearly
satisfy the emergency condition criteria, is an example of how
these particular CPIA procedural safeguards inhibit the CPIA from
reaching its objective of deterring pillage. Iraq is a State Party to
the UNESCO Convention. It would clearly qualify for U.S. import
restrictions under the emergency action section of the CPIA.
However, without a formal government, Iraq is unable to make a
2003] 445
65
Borke: Searching for a Solution: An Analysis of the Legislative Response
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ. ART. & ENT. LAW [Vol. XIII:381
formal request for import restrictions so the CPIA approval
process cannot be initiated.
Even if Iraq were able to make a formal request, the provision
requiring a CPAC recommendation further hinders the timeliness
of a U.S. response to true emergencies. Currently Section 2603
gives the CPAC 90 days to make a recommendation to the
President. When one considers the damage and looting at the
National Museum in Baghdad that occurred over the course of two
days, allowing three months for administerial decision-making is
not an effective means of providing emergency protection. By
eliminating the CPAC recommendation requirement, the President
would be able to respond to situations, like that of Iraq, in a timely
manner. This change is necessary to achieve the objective of
deterring serious situations of pillage. Furthermore, the CPIA
provision allowing continuous CPAC review will continue to act
as a check on all emergency actions authorized by the President.
c. Extension of Import Restriction Term Length to Ten
Years Renewable for Additional Ten-Year Periods
The CPIA is based on the theory that import restrictions
imposed by the United States, a market country, will cause a
significant decrease in the demand of the antiquities subject to the
restriction, thereby reducing the market price and, hence, the
incentive to loot. Where the market price and demand drop, the
profitability and the incentive to loot diminishes. At issue is
whether, by extending the duration of import restrictions, such
restrictions will affect the market price and decrease demand for
antiquities on the global market or whether other less restrictive
means exist to achieve such goals.
When applying a supply and demand theory to the antiquities
market, one must consider the peculiar nature of the market. A
reduction in the demand on the legitimate art market in the United
States does not necessarily affect the total world-wide demand for
antiquities. It is necessary to consider the black market for
antiquities, the existing demand in other market countries, and the
inelasticity of unique, non-renewable resources.
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Strict import restrictions in market countries may reduce some
demand of art collectors and dealers who desire to trade in only
legitimate objects. However, the legitimate market for antiquities
is small in comparison to the entire art market. The demand for
antiquities cannot be viewed in a vacuum of legitimate and known
collectors. It is not disputed that a significant black market for
antiquities exists. The existence of any demand, whether on the
legitimate or illegal market, helps antiquities retain a constant
inflated value. Furthermore, antiquities retain great value
regardless of minor increases and decreases in the demand on the
legitimate art market. Therefore, antiquities continue to be traded
at exorbitant prices on the black market. The existence of black
market demand inhibits any measures intended to decrease the
incentive to loot.
If open trade in antiquities is restricted through the imposition of
import bans, then the trade of antiquities will be driven
underground to the illegal black market. Import restrictions will
merely force a change in the method of distribution from open
market trade to black market trade. Increased sales on the illicit
market inflate the market price because it is more risky to trade on
the black market. The discrete nature of the market also causes
price inflation because of a lack of open price competition. The
secrecy of the black market affects information loss in two other
respects. The scientific community loses contextual information
because the object's origin is often lost through the trade process.
And the general public loses information because they are not
exposed to the vast array of cultural material that is available.
Where the effect of import restrictions is an increase of sales on
the black market, import restrictions are not serving the purpose of
protecting cultural property.
Import restrictions also reduce the transparency of trade, thereby
inflating the price due to lack of price competition. Black market
trade lacks the price competition necessary for consumers to trade
at a fair market price. The existence of consumers willing to pay
inflated prices provides an incentive rather than a disincentive to
loot. On the other hand, open market trade increases visibility. A
free and open market would reduce the impact of black market
20031
67
Borke: Searching for a Solution: An Analysis of the Legislative Response
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ.ART. &ENT. LAW [Vol. XIII:381
trade on the inflated price of antiquities. If the price were
controlled by competition and consumer access to price
information on the open market, then prices would likely drop.
Lower prices, and, therefore, lower profits for traders would have a
more likely result of reducing the incentive to trade in stolen
antiquities.
Open trade provides other benefits to the source country. It
increases global knowledge and awareness of antiquities. Such
increased awareness may stimulate tourism in the source country.
Tourism driven by cultural property provides the source country
with an incentive to protect and preserve its resource, the cultural
property, in order to sustain a long-term source of revenue.
Open trade increases international knowledge of antiquities and
encourages the sharing of cultural information. The availability of
information acts as a stimulus necessary to increase tourism.
Countries rich in cultural property resources have a potential
economic stimulant that can be used to develop a strong tourism
industry. Cultural tourism can be a great source of national
income for developing countries. Wealthy tourists transfer their
wealth from the market country to the source country by visiting
cultural destinations. By deriving profits from the tourism
industry, the transfer of wealth is from the market country to the
country of origin, rather than to the middle-men countries. Thus,
the source country receives the direct economic benefit from
cultural property tourism. In order for this tourism model to be
effective, it requires the source country to domestically protect and
preserve its cultural property, as well as to stimulate tourism
interest by controlling the dissemination of antiquities onto the
open market. The source country could maximize its profits from
its cultural property resources by allowing open trade of some of
its antiquities on the international market thereby stimulating
cultural tourism interest, and by enacting and strictly enforcing
protective cultural property laws at the domestic level. However,
the achievement of a thriving tourism industry based on cultural
property resources takes years to develop. It may be necessary for
the international community to aid the source country in protecting
is cultural property by imposing short term import bans that run
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only long enough for the source country to implement a protective
domestic infrastructure.
With the goal of source country tourism in mind, a less trade
restrictive means of reducing pillage would be for the source
country to create a protective infrastructure that effectively guards
and preserves its own cultural property. This requires the
enactment of protective laws that are strictly and effectively
enforced. Furthermore, publicity can play a large role in
decreasing the incentive to loot. The general public views looting
and pillage negatively. A country plagued with rampant pillage
and looting can create negative publicity by exposing the looting
epidemic through the media. This puts the world on alert that
certain objects from that country may appear on the market as a
result of pillage. Widespread knowledge that certain types of
cultural property from certain countries are likely available due to
looting and illegal acquisition makes collectors reluctant to
purchase such objects. Publicity of well-known pieces renders
them unmarketable .... "Some art objects are so well known there
is no market."25 In this way, media exposure can help drive down
the demand for such antiquities on the international art market.
Such a reduction in demand reduces the incentive to loot. It can
also create domestic public awareness of the pillage situation in
the source country. This may further aid in the reduction of
incentive to loot where looting becomes socially unacceptable.
To summarize, it is not clear that by extending the duration of
import restrictions, the incentive to loot and pillage will be
reduced. U.S. import restrictions do not necessarily decrease
demand to the level required to reduce the incentive to loot and
pillage. Rather, import restrictions should be viewed as a means of
providing the country of origin an incentive to strengthen its own
domestic protections. A reduction in pillage can be achieved
through the combination of strong domestic protections and an
open, transparent international market.
Following from this analysis, I propose that market restrictions
250. Zottin, Linda Hales, Treasure Hunt: Art Cops Cast a Cultural Dragnet,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 14, 2003, at El (quoting Italian General Ugo Zottin).
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should only be imposed for the amount of time necessary for the
country of origin to implement domestic cultural property laws and
an effective law enforcement infrastructure. If Congress can prove
that five years is an insufficient length of time for a country to
achieve effective domestic protection and that ten-year import
restrictions are necessary then I would support a time extension
amendment to the CPIA. Ten years of import restrictions will not
unreasonably restrain trade, where that time is necessary for the
creation of permanent protections at the domestic level in the
country of origin. The procedural safeguards provided by the
CPIA ensure that the restrictions cannot be imposed or renewed
except when necessary. Namely, the CPIA provides for ongoing
committee review. Furthermore, the renewal of restrictions is
conditional upon a finding that the situation continues to meet the
criteria necessary to enter the original bilateral agreement or
emergency action. Where actual proof can be offered to show that
ten-year agreements are necessary, then the procedural safeguards
of the CPIA will ensure that the extended period is the least
restrictive means of achieving international cultural property
protection. Absent such proof, I cannot support the duration
extension of import restrictions imposed pursuant to the CPIA.
d. Minimum Age Requirement for Archaeological
Material
Archaeological material is relevant only to bilateral agreements
and emergency condition actions under the CPIA. U.S. import
restrictions imposed on archaeological material of other countries
are authorized by the CPIA's implementation of Article 9 of the
UNESCO Convention.25' The UNESCO Convention provides
251. See Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970
823 U.N.T.S. 231, art. 9 (1972).
Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is in
jeopardy from pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials may
call upon other States Parties who are affected. The States Parties to this
Convention undertake, in these circumstances, to participate in a
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several different categories of material considered "cultural
property." Only "antiquities" are given a specific minimum age
requirement: they must be more than one hundred years old.25 2
Under the UNESCO Convention, Article 9 explicitly addresses
archaeological and ethnological materials. 3  Where the
Convention defines these categories of cultural property without
stating a minimum age requirement, the State Party's legislature is
given discretion to set such standards. The U.S. Congress set the
minimum age requirement for archaeological material at 250 years
under the CPIA. However, under ARPA, protection for domestic
archaeological material has a 100-year minimum. ARPA protects
archaeological sites and materials domestically. It does not
include a provision for ethnological material.
Arguably, that ethnological material does not have a minimum
age requirement Congress indicated that more recent material
could be subject to import restrictions. Given that more recent
vintage material can be covered under the ethnological category of
the CPIA, it may not be necessary to reconcile the age discrepancy
for archaeological material in these two pieces of legislation. By
extending the scope of material eligible for U.S. import restrictions
to objects that are merely 100 years old, the possible protections
under the CPIA reach beyond those intended by Congress when it
implemented the UNESCO Convention. A change in the
minimum age requirement from 250 years to 100 years for
archaeological material has the potential to sweep too broadly by
widening the scope of recent vintage material eligible for
protection. A broad definition of archaeological material would
allow the U.S. to enter bilateral agreements that are nearly totally
inclusive of all material found and removed from the ground. If,
concerted international effort to determine and to carry out the necessary
concrete measures, including the control of exports and imports and
international commerce in the specific material concerned. Pending
agreement each State concerned shall take provisional measures to the
extent feasible to prevent irremediable injury to the cultural heritage of
the requesting State. Id. (emphasis added).
252. Id. art. l(e).
253. See supra note 247.
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however, Congress can provide specific findings that show how
the archaeological material age change is necessary to achieve the
objective of deterring serious situations of pillage then I would
support this amendment to the CPIA.
VII. CONCLUSION
Due to the ongoing looting of several archaeological sites
throughout Iraq and the severe damage and looting of the National
Museum, the Iraqi situation is one that warrants U.S. aid. The
current U.S. protections provided by the OFAC sanctions and the
CPIA are an inadequate remedy for the epidemic cultural property
loss in Iraq. In search of a legal solution to the problem at hand,
Congress proposed three bills: H.R. 2009, S. 1291, and H.R. 3497.
Each is distinctly different in its approach to protecting Iraq's
antiquities from illegal importation into the United States. After
carefully analyzing the actual impact that each bill could have on
current U.S. legal structures, as well as on the trade of Iraqi
Antiquities, it is clear that H.R. 3497 is the best solution. However,
each amendment to the CPIA, as proposed in H.R. 3497, should be
strictly scrutinized and supported by actual proof of its necessity
before drastically changing the scope of trade restrictions available
pursuant to the CPIA.
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